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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A.   The Background and Utility of Land-Based Agreements 
 The Anglo-American common law of property has developed over 
many centuries creating legally-recognized private property rights 
that have become the background principles of land ownership and 
use. While numerous justifications have been given explaining or 
supporting the institution of private property,1 private ownership of 
land and buildings has become a fundamental element of the econom-
ic and social structure of American society as well as many others.2 
Within the general concept of land ownership, many different, land-
based legal ownership principles exist defining the existence and lim-
its of private rights. One of the most practical and significant sets of 
these rules concerns the enforcement of private land use arrange-
ments, otherwise known in the law as easements, real covenants, and 
equitable servitudes.3 The law relating to these non-possessory land 
rights forms an important cornerstone of American real estate law 
and has been of great practical significance to land owners and de-
velopers, securing “economic, aesthetic, and personal advantages to 
the owners . . . of land.”4 Having a lengthy pedigree reaching back to 
early English and Roman law,5 these common law doctrines have 
been adopted in every American state and have been found to be ex-
tremely useful in facilitating modern land development for a range of 
purposes in residential, commercial, and other contexts.6 Represent-
                                                                                                                                        
 1. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 2 (3d ed. 
2000) (identifying five separate theories as grounding this legal phenomena). 
 2. Bernhard Heitger, Property Rights and the Wealth of Nations: A Cross-Country 
Study, 23 CATO J. 381, 382-85 (2004). 
 3. The English courts had recognized four variations of these private land-based 
agreements: easements, profits á prendre, real covenants, and equitable servitudes. For 
purposes of this discussion, easements and profits á prendre will be considered together 
since they both possess similar doctrinal features.  
 4. Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient 
Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1262 (1982) [hereinafter French, Toward a Modern Law]. 
 5. Susan F. French, Design Proposal for the New Restatement of the Law of Proper-
ty—Servitudes, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1213, 1213-14 (1988) [hereinafter French, Design 
Proposal]. Professor French, the Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servi-
tudes, wrote that “[s]ervitudes have been known since ancient times,” explaining that rights 
of way appear in the Twelve Tables of Rome and a running covenant giving a landowner the 
right to sing in the manor chapel was described in an English Year Book case decision in 
1368. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, intro. at 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  
 6. Professor Gerald Korngold has noted: “Developers use easements, real covenants, 
and equitable servitudes to increase efficient use of land, create neighborhood ambience, 
foster cooperation and dispute resolution among neighbors, and enhance personal satisfac-
tion of owners. Residential subdivision developments typically grant the owners rights in 
common areas, restrict the construction and uses of the lots, require payment of mainte-
nance assessments from the owners, and so create a private government of owners to en-
force and supervise the residential plan. Easements and covenants are used in shopping 
centers and industrial and office parks to restrict business operations, control construction, 
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ing potentially permanent property rights binding successive owners 
and not bilateral contracts only linking two bargaining parties, servi-
tudes have become vital property interests establishing rights and 
duties that, when properly formed, can have powerful effects on the 
ownership and use of land. The significance of these common, law-
created land ownership rights cannot be overstated. 
B.   The Growth of Common Law Rules for Servitudes and the Need 
for Reform 
 The law related to these land-based rights has developed largely 
as judge-made legal principles, finding their main doctrinal focus in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century English and American case deci-
sions.7 Although many practical overlaps exist between these three 
devices, the common law case development has treated them as dis-
tinct legal categories possessing different doctrinal elements.8 With 
these theoretical differences applying to functionally-equivalent land 
interests, some judicial and academic commentators have expressed 
their frustration with the incoherence of the legal doctrine9 and re-
quested clarification and simplification in order to improve their util-
ity. One such mid-century critic, Charles E. Clark, a twentieth-
century scholar and federal judge, found that “no consistent body of 
legal principles has developed with respect to them; and the applica-
ble rules of law, both anciently and now, are confused and diverse.”10 
                                                                                                                                        
create reciprocal rights, and allocate expenses for commonly shared facilities . . . and 
maintenance.” GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL 
COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 1.01 at 1-2 (1990); see also French, Toward a 
Modern Law, supra note 4, at 1263-64. 
 7. See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925); Neponsit Prop. Owners’ 
Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938); Tulk v. Moxhay [1848] 41 
Eng. Rep. 1143 (UK). 
 8. As noted by Professor Susan F. French, the Reporter for the Third Restatement of 
the Law of Property (Servitudes): “Easements, covenants and equitable servitudes serve 
the same general purpose—they create rights, obligations and restrictions affecting owner-
ship, occupancy and use of land. However, each has a distinct set of rules governing its 
formation and application. Why the common law developed three doctrinally separate de-
vices to accomplish similar and overlapping functions is a matter of history rather than of 
logic or necessity.” French, Toward a Modern Law, supra note 4, at 1264. 
 9. Academic writing has criticized the incoherence of this area of law with striking 
language. See Jan Z. Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Homes Associations: A New Perspec-
tive, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 717 (1975) (“Unfortunately, the law that relates to affirmative 
covenants presents the ordinary mortal with one of the most confounding intellectual expe-
riences he can suffer.”). Even Professor French found this confusing when teaching the 
subject to law students. See Susan F. French, Comment, The Touch and Concern Doctrine 
and the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes: A Tribute to Lawrence E. Berger, 77 NEB. L. 
REV. 653, 656 (1998) (describing her first time teaching real covenants and equitable servi-
tudes as being a “nightmare”). 
 10. 1 CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH “RUN WITH 
LAND”: INCLUDING LICENSES, EASEMENTS, PROFITS, EQUITABLE RESTRICTIONS AND RENTS 2 
(2d ed. 1947).  
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He concluded that “[c]onfusion results from the fact that essentially 
the same interest may be treated under some circumstances as any 
one of these things.”11 Modern case decisions have echoed  
this sentiment.12 
 Beyond doctrinal confusion, antiquated terminology as well as in-
adequate or unexpressed policy justifications limited the modern util-
ity of these devices in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Some case precedent actually discouraged the use of servitudes by 
reinforcing doctrinal barriers that barred certain useful techniques.13 
Started in 1923, the American Law Institute (ALI) embarked on its 
essential project to “restate” the law in volumes of thoughtfully-
prepared description.14 A first Restatement of Property effort was 
undertaken in 1927, where the plan was to restate the existing com-
mon law in an “orderly statement.”15 Emphasizing clarity of termi-
nology and uniformity of principles,16 its main function was to be a 
unified description of existing rules with limited advocacy of doctri-
                                                                                                                                        
 11. Id. at 5. Judge Clark’s effort to clarify and improve the law by writing persuasive 
books was apparently met with only limited success. Professor Myres S. McDougal, in his 
review of Clark’s second edition, finds “continued confusion” and “unslaked bewilderment 
in judicial opinion and decision” of the area reinforced by a failed Restatement (First) of 
Property: Servitudes that was issued in 1936-1940. Myres S. McDougal, Book Review, 58 
YALE L.J. 500, 501 (1949). Academic critique of this area of law continued for several dec-
ades. See EDWARD H. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 489 (1974) 
(calling post-1930s First Restatement servitude law an “unspeakable quagmire”). 
 12. See, e.g., Patterson v. Paul, 863 N.E.2d 527, 534-36 (Mass. 2007) (judicial deci-
sionmaking contorted distinctions in servitude categories to preserve easement rights). 
Other cases have struggled to differentiate between forms of servitudes. See Dickson v. 
Kates, 133 P.3d 498, 502 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (attempting to differentiate between an 
easement and a real covenant). 
 13. A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern Is Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 77 NEB. L. 
REV. 804, 806 (1998) (finding affirmative covenants requiring the payment of money to be 
“potential engines of small landowner bankruptcy”); see also Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an 
Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 1988 DUKE L.J. 925, 962 (1988); Note, 
Touch and Concern, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, and a Proposal, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 938, 939 (2009).  
 14. The establishment of the American Law Institute in 1923 was heralded as “an 
effort to unite elite practitioners and professors in the cause of a particular sort of law ‘re-
form,’ namely the overhauling of the corpus of common law subjects to respond to the per-
ceived problems of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘complexity.’ ” G. Edward White, The American Law 
Institute and the Triumph of Modernist Jurisprudence, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 29 (1997). 
 15. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. Vol. I, intro. at viii-ix (AM. LAW INST. 1936). The 
reporters for each of the five volumes represented the academic luminaries of their day 
including Harry Bigelow (University of Chicago), Richard Powell (Columbia Law School), 
James Casner (Harvard Law School), Barton Leach (Harvard Law School), and Oliver S. 
Rundell (University of Wisconsin). Professor Rundell was responsible for the fifth and final 
volume on servitudes. Id. at x, xiii; Vol. III at v, Vol. IV at v-vi; Vol. V at v.  
 16. The ALI Restatement project also emphasized a more scientific view of the law, 
using a more precise language of the law. Employing the Hohfeldian classification termi-
nology of “right, privilege, power, and immunity,” to describe fundamental legal concepts, 
the First Restatement of Property attempted to use this phrasing to establish a uniform 
system of legal concepts or classifications. See White, supra note 14, at 30. 
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nal reform.17 The drafting committee completed its work with a five 
volume treatise, including servitudes, in 1944.18 Coming on the heels 
of the First Restatement of Property, which had generally reinforced 
existing practices and failed to revitalize or reform the state of the 
law,19 some commentators expressed dissatisfaction with such a lim-
ited approach. Judge Clark’s book—Real Covenants and Other Inter-
ests Which Run with the Land—stated a stronger view that demand-
ed a strategic overhaul of the existing legal regime.20 He was not 
alone.21 In the post-war era, criticism of the prevailing legal structure 
mounted, yet state legislatures and state courts did little toward ac-
complishing systematic and comprehensive reform.22 Judicial inertia 
                                                                                                                                        
 17. A contemporaneous review described the First Restatement in the following 
terms: “[It] is not only an accurate, clear and succinct presentation of the common law, as it 
exists in the United States today, but in addition, statutory changes have been considered 
and the law under existing statutes stated. . . . Where uniformity among the decisions does 
not exist, the conflicting rules are stated and the reasons in support thereof are considered. 
Unless the authorities in support of a rule are too imposing, the rule most consonant with 
reason is adopted.” Louis S. Herrink, Book Review, 23 VA. L. REV. 742, 742-43 (1937). This 
limited law reform attitude focused more on unification of the law than advocacy or reform 
of the law into new patterns. 
 18. The First Restatement functioned as a clear declaration of American property law 
with citations to case decisions in the West reporter system and to law review articles that 
had cited previous drafts of the Restatement. Some contemporaneous commentators ap-
proved of the form and substance of the Restatement. See, e.g., George F. James, Book 
Review, 47 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241 (1938) (“[The first two volumes] are clear, well organized, 
well indexed and highly usable.”); John P. Maloney, Book Review, 12 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 
21 (1937) (“The Restatement . . . is the most scientific system, from the standpoint of ar-
rangement and classification of the common law of property, that we know of. . . . [I]t is 
apparent that a real contribution to the science of law will have been made when the entire 
field will have been covered.”); Merrill I. Schnebly, Book Review, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 881, 
881 (1937) (“The Hohfeldian system of legal terminology is incorporated in toto. In general, 
the adoption of this terminology is to be commended, for in the field of property law espe-
cially it conduces to accuracy and clarity of expression.”). 
 19. Tarlock, supra note 13, at 806 (viewing the First Restatement as a “failed reform 
exercise” taking a “dim view of covenants running with the land”). Professor Tarlock noted 
further that due to its restrictive attitude regarding the running of affirmative covenants, 
the Restatement was “largely ignored by [the] courts. . . never enjoy[ing] the prestige of the 
Restatements of Contracts and Torts and consequently, never bec[oming] an important 
source of doctrinal reform.” Id. 
 20. See generally CLARK, supra note 10. 
 21. Percy Bordwell, Book Review, 51 HARV. L. REV. 565, 566 (1938) (“Not content with 
its new-found independence, [in summarizing English common law principles but provid-
ing a more modern American view,] however, the [ALI] seems to have gone wild.”); Myres 
S. McDougal, Book Review, 32 ILL. L. REV. 509, 513 (1937) (“To assume that the judicial 
handling of property problems in contemporary America can be made more predictable by 
an authoritative canonization and rationalization of ancient, feudal-conditioned  
concepts . . . is little short of fantastic.”); Schnebly, supra note 18, at 881 (“In some instanc-
es . . . rigid adherence to a scheme of scientific organization has impaired the practical 
value of the work.”); William R. Vance, Book Review, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 178 (1937) 
(“The plan of the Restatement is based upon the misconception that ‘the law’ is static and 
capable of formulary statement; that it is subject to still photography.”). 
 22. See French, Toward a Modern Law, supra note 4, at 1262 n.3 (listing critical 
scholarship both pre- and post-1950). 
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in dealing with these problems should not be surprising, since revi-
sion of this complex area of the law would require a comprehensive 
adjustment to centuries of common law judicial opinions. This would 
not be possible through the usual method of case-by-case lawmak-
ing.23 The ALI did undertake a second Restatement of Property, but 
it was focused on landlord/tenant law in the 1970s and on donative 
transfers in the 1990s and 2000s.24 Neither project reconsidered the 
topic of servitudes nor many of the other subjects contained in the 
First Restatement.25 Rather than merely describing the state of the 
law, the Second Restatement affirmatively advocated new legal and 
policy positions and guiding concepts that were advanced to shape 
the future course of the law.  
 The confusing condition of the common law of servitudes remained 
as a subject for future attention by the ALI. Ultimately, what was 
believed to be necessary was a detailed and comprehensive blueprint 
for the revision of state law; yet none would be forthcoming until 
2000, when the Third Restatement was published in final form.26 Cu-
riously, the use of privately-developed land use arrangements—often 
termed covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs)—actually 
gained momentum in the post-World War II period, and these devices 
were increasingly employed to create a private governing structure 
                                                                                                                                        
 23. Professor Horwitz captured the sense of gradual evolution in the common law 
when he wrote that, “[c]hange in common law doctrine . . . is rarely abrupt, especially when 
a major transformation in the meaning of property is involved. Common lawyers are more 
comfortable with a process of gradually giving new meanings to old formulas than with 
explicitly casting the old doctrines aside. Thus, it is not surprising that, in periods of great 
conceptual tension, there emerges a treatise writer who tries to smooth over existing 
stresses in the law. Some such writers try to nudge legal doctrine forward by extracting 
from the existing conflict principles that are implicit but have not yet been expressed.” 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 38 (1979). 
 24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (AM. LAW 
INST. 1999); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
 25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT (AM. LAW INST. 1977); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS (AM. LAW INST. 1992). Landlord / 
tenant law had received limited consideration in the First Restatement, and the decade of 
the 1970s was an era of vigorous law reform where courts increasingly found tenant rights 
that had not existed in the common law of property. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 
428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Green v. Superior Court of S.F., 517 P.2d 1168, 1169 
(Cal. 1974); Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 280 
N.E.2d 208 (Ill. 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 521 P.2d 304 (Kan. 1974); Bos. Hous. Auth. v. 
Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973); Rome v. Walker, 196 N.W.2d 850 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1972); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268 (N.J. 1969); Kamarath v. Bennett, 
568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. 1978). There have been two other Third Restatements in the areas of 
mortgages (1997) and wills and other donative transfers (2011). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (AM. LAW INST. 1999-2011); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES (AM. LAW INST. 1997). 
 26. As Professor Lance Liebman, then the director of the ALI, wrote in 2000, “The 
underlying law is largely judge-made. Doctrine varies around the country. Few scholars, 
practitioners, or judges have had the incentive to propose coherent and policy-based re-
form.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, Foreward at X (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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for residential communities in the form of homeowner associations in 
subdivisions and condominium projects.27 Courts found creative ways 
to permit these emerging practices, often struggling against the 
weight of existing legal doctrine.28 
C.   Developing the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 
 Nearly four decades after the publication of the First Restate-
ment, Professor Susan F. French confronted the complex issue of 
comprehensive servitude doctrinal revision in her academic scholar-
ship. She published a highly significant law review article that pro-
posed a simplification for the law of servitudes and set forth the out-
lines of broad doctrinal modernization that would “provide significant 
benefits to both the public and the legal profession.”29 While many 
law scholars critique specific aspects of existing legal doctrine in 
their work, few attempt to propose a comprehensive reform to a 
large, traditional area of the law. However, Professor French chose 
that formidable task. In the spring of 1986, several years after her 
earlier law review work, she was appointed to serve as the Reporter 
for the ALI’s Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes.30  
 A year later, she announced the outlines of a proposal for a gen-
eral doctrinal revision regarding land-based servitudes that consoli-
dated the common law variants into one unified legal concept called 
                                                                                                                                        
 27. EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF 
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 29-55 (1994). 
 28. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 513-14. Professors Stoebuck and Whit-
man described these innovative, yet supportive, decisions to be “second-generation” cases 
which might “invite[] speculation as to its theoretical base.” Id. at 513. Reflecting realisti-
cally on judicial motivations they wrote: “Whether one wants to label this reasoning a de-
parture from traditional running covenant theory or simply the appending of other doc-
trines to such theory, it opens up a new dimension for subdivision restrictions. Clearly, 
here is another case in which American courts are persuaded of the socioeconomic utility of 
private land use controls.” Id. at 514. 
 29. French, Toward a Modern Law, supra note 4, at 1265. Professor French’s article 
was part of an impressive array of legal scholarship published in this law review issue, 
including pieces authored by Curtis J. Berger, Lawrence Berger, Allison Dunham, Richard 
A. Epstein, Bernard E. Jacob, Carol M. Rose, and Michael F. Sturley. In part III, Professor 
French provided “Outlines of a Modern Law of Servitudes” that established the ground-
work for her later draft of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes. Id. at 1304-18. 
Other articles on this issue also recommended a comprehensive revision to the law  
of servitudes. 
 30. After a Reporter is designated, that person is responsible for “shaping the Re-
statement’s form and content.” See Susan F. French, Servitudes Reform and the New Re-
statement of Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 928, 930 n.10 (1988) [hereinafter French, Servitudes Reform]. The ALI requires the 
submission of drafts to advisors followed by approval by both the ALI Council and general 
membership. Once approved by the membership, the draft becomes a “Restatement.” Id.  
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the “servitude.”31 The 1988 U.C. Davis Law Review article detailed a 
specific design proposal for a new Restatement of the Law of Property 
that was later implemented as the ALI’s Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes.32 This “modern integrated body of law” would 
apply consistent legal doctrine except when “real differences” would 
reasonably require a different result.33 Seeing their utility in the con-
temporary world, Professor French expressed a tolerant attitude to-
wards the creation of servitudes so long as they “do not run afoul of 
constitutional, statutory, or public policy norms.”34 Sensitive to the 
potential for the gradual deterioration in the social utility of land 
servitudes over time, she planned for a termination feature when 
they would become “obsolete or unduly burdensome.”35 In essence, 
Professor French’s article proposed an overarching reconsideration of 
American servitude law “to meet the needs of the twenty-first centu-
ry.”36 With this scholarly foundation, the ALI was presented with a 
new project that would express and clarify this important yet confus-
ing area of the common law.37 In addition, it would suggest new prin-
ciples for the law to adopt that would not only clarify the law but 
would advance certain normative goals that were deemed desirable 
to the drafters. 
D.   Making the Third Restatement a Reality 
 Work on the initial draft of the Third Restatement began in 1987 
and concluded with the ALI’s publication of the final version in May, 
2000.38 Professor Susan F. French39 chaired the effort, and she was 
assisted by advisors and a Members Consultative Group that worked 
                                                                                                                                        
 31. See id. at 951-52. Academic scholarship in the 1980s had consistently called for a 
unification of the law of easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes under a uni-
tary heading of “servitude.” See KORNGOLD, supra note 6, at 3 n.13. 
 32. See generally French, Design Proposal, supra note 5.  
 33. Id. at 1231. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Susan F. French, Highlights of the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servi-
tudes, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 225, 226 (2000) [hereinafter French, Highlights]. 
 37. The desire to provide clarification and thoughtful analysis to the law with a new 
Restatement has recently been expressed for the field of environmental law by a group of 
legal academicians. They have argued that while Restatements were not binding authority, 
they “carry strong persuasive effect because the ALI’s painstaking and collaborative pro-
cess creates a reliable consensus of the U.S. legal community on what the law is, or should 
be, in a particular area.” See Irma S. Russell et al., Time for a Restatement, 32 ENVTL. F. 
38, 38-39 (2015). In recognition of the continuing significance of servitude reform, the ALI 
recently announced a new Restatement of Property (Fourth) project whose scope would 
include easements and covenants. See Press Release, Am. L. Inst., The American Law In-
stitute Announces Four New Projects (Nov. 17, 2014).  
 38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 39. Professor French had a long and distinguished academic career, serving on the 
faculty of the University of California at Los Angeles and other law schools.  
2016]  FIXING A BROKEN COMMON LAW 151 
   
on the project over this thirteen-year period. There were numerous 
public discussions of the developing Restatement tentative drafts at 
annual ALI meetings at various points during this period.40 During 
these sessions, Professor French responded to questions regarding 
the developing draft in a fashion similar to a legislative counsel dur-
ing the mark-up of pending legislation.41 The final version of the new 
Restatement was contained in two volumes covering nearly 1375 
pages of text and structured with principles, explanatory comments, 
illustrations, statutory notes, and detailed reporter’s notes.42 These 
volumes represented a prodigious amount of careful thought and 
hard work spanning over more than a decade. 
E.   What the Third Restatement Did 
 The Restatement undertook a task that went far beyond merely 
restating or simplifying existing law. The work introduced new legal 
concepts that built on existing doctrine, and it stated a clearer nor-
mative policy that actually attempted to reform the law.43 The new 
Restatement was composed of eight chapters, each with numerous 
definition and explanatory subsections. This new approach to land-
based servitudes contained a number of central goals to revamp the 
existing legal structure. First, it attempted to streamline the law of 
servitudes by eliminating the independent doctrinal categories for 
easements, profits, and covenants. Instead, the Restatement treated 
them “as different types of servitudes governed by a single body of 
law.”44 This unification was intended to rationalize the demands of 
                                                                                                                                        
 40. After meeting with the Advisors in January, 1988, to determine the scope and 
approach of the project, Professor French and her colleagues had six “[t]entative [d]rafts” of 
the developing Restatement in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996 that were all adopt-
ed by the ALI. See Susan F. French, Tradition and Innovation in the New Restatement of 
Servitudes: A Report From Midpoint, 27 CONN. L. REV. 119, 119 n.4 (1994) [hereinafter 
French, Tradition]. 
 41. See, e.g., Am. L. Inst., 75th Annual Meeting—1998 Proceedings, 75 A.L.I. PROC. 
210-16 (1999) (discussing chapter 8 of the proposed text dealing with the appropriate en-
forcement of servitudes). 
 42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 43. The precise purpose of the Restatement process has been subject to differing 
points of view. A traditional approach contained in the original charter of the ALI viewed 
the Restatement as a device “to promote the clarification and simplification of the law” in 
an effort to assist practitioners and jurists. See Kathryn N. Fine, The Corporate Govern-
ance Debate and the ALI Proposals: Reform or Restatement?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 693, 694 
(1987) (quoting Melvin Aron Eisenberg, An Introduction to the American Law Institute’s 
Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 495, 495 (1984)). An alternative 
outlook considered the Restatement as a process of law reform that would seek to make 
law function more efficiently and also to achieve different policy goals. See Charles Hansen 
et al., The Role of Disinterested Directors in “Conflict” Transactions: The ALI Corporate 
Governance Project and Existing Law, 45 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2083-84 (1990). In this light, a 
Restatement could be offered to the courts as a thoughtful way to change existing law in a 
more normative way. 
 44. French, Highlights, supra note 36, at 227. 
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doctrine, preserving differences only when they could be justified 
within the general theoretical framework. Second, the Restatement 
reduced the number of subcategories of servitudes to three: profits, 
easements, and covenants.45 This simplification eliminated terminol-
ogy such as negative easements, equitable servitudes, easements by 
estoppel, and executed parol licenses in an effort to reduce confusion 
and unnecessary legal complexity. The law of servitudes had been 
“encrusted” by many different descriptive terms for servitudes that 
had increased the confusion of lawyers as well as judges.46 Third, the 
Restatement advanced a number of definitional and interpretive 
rules for servitudes drafted by parties employing written documents. 
These principles emphasized a range of ideas that would support ser-
vitudes. These ideas included effectuating a party’s intentions, pre-
suming the validity of servitudes if the purpose was not illegal as in 
the case of servitudes that were unconstitutional or contrary to pub-
lic policy,47 generally running servitudes’ benefits and burdens to 
bind successors, and enforcing servitudes by any beneficiary through 
appropriate legal and equitable remedies.48 
 Fourth, the Restatement eliminated, or reformulated, a number of 
traditional doctrinal elements of servitudes that were believed to “no 
longer serve useful functions or [to] unnecessarily interfere with le-
gitimate servitude uses [it] made possible.”49 Many of these features 
had remained in the common law despite the fact that they were 
poorly understood by property owners and by judges alike. In addi-
tion, the policy basis for some of these legal provisions was murky or, 
at best, outdated. Some of these confusing theoretical elements were 
legal rules imposing a number of crucial technical requirements. 
These included requiring vertical and horizontal privity between par-
ties as a predicate for enforcement,50 common law principles impos-
ing limits on affirmative covenant burdens,51 the running of benefits 
                                                                                                                                        
 45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 1.1-1.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
Slight additional sub-classifications were recognized in affirmative / negative covenants 
and the conservation servitude. Id. §§ 1.3, 1.6. 
 46. See, e.g., Sanborn v. McLean, 206 N.W. 496 (Mich. 1925) (recognizing a “reciprocal 
negative easement”). 
 47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). This 
section emphasized the general freedom of parties to contract land servitudes and placed 
the burden on challengers to establish that the servitude violates the terms of section 3.1. 
It also provided an extended explanation of the public policy limitation. 
 48. French, Highlights, supra note 36, at 228-29. The Restatement attempts to im-
prove judicial tools for managing servitudes by “giv[ing] courts better tools for maintaining 
the viability of servitude arrangements over time and for terminating those which have 
become obsolete or unduly burdensome.” French, Tradition, supra note 40, at 129. 
 49. French, Highlights, supra note 36, at 229. 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 51. Id. §§ 3.1, 7.12. 
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in gross,52 and the enforcement powers of third party beneficiaries of 
covenants.53 Perhaps the most striking reform was the elimination of 
the traditional real covenant element that to be enforceable by suc-
cessors, a promise had to “touch or concern” the land.54 This powerful 
and longstanding doctrinal requirement55 had given courts the au-
thority to refuse to enforce a variety of existing covenants, often 
based on the judicial conclusion that the promise in question failed to 
“touch or concern” the land. These legal conclusions negated land-
based agreements often without acknowledging the significant con-
siderations leading to that result.56 Not surprisingly, this provision 
has challenged traditional judicial power and has garnered a mixed 
review from some academic commentators.57 
II.   THE RECEPTION OF THE THIRD RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 
 The principal question raised by this Article is how has the Third 
Restatement actually affected the law of servitudes in the United 
States? In the fifteen years following the publication of this updated 
view of private land arrangements, American courts and litigants 
have had the opportunity to consider the Third Restatement as a new 
way of addressing the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of 
easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes. During this pe-
riod, advocates could have employed the Third Restatement to frame 
or bolster their legal arguments. Judges, on the other hand, could 
have relied on this work in the texts of their opinions to support as-
pects of their case decisions. While it is also possible that the Third 
Restatement could have affected the law in less direct ways, it is the 
judicial reception and case-by-case application of its provisions that 
are the central foci of this research. This Article examines how the 
Third Restatement has influenced the development of the American 
law of servitudes in state and federal court decisions since its final 
adoption by the ALI in 2000. With the recent announcement of a 
comprehensive Fourth Property Restatement project in 2015, the re-
                                                                                                                                        
 52. Id. §§ 2.6, 8.1.  
 53. Id. § 2.6 (stating that parties can create servitudes to benefit third parties). 
 54. Id. § 3.2. In Comment b the Reporter wrote, “[i]ts vagueness, its obscurity, its intent-
defeating character, and its growing redundancy have become increasingly apparent.” Id. 
 55. See Spencer’s Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (KB). 
 56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). The Re-
porter noted that modern courts would employ “the obsolete and confusing rhetoric of touch 
or concern” when actually grounding their decisions on a range of contemporary considera-
tions. However, employing the doctrine “does not provide the means to discriminate between 
those which should and should not be enforced, and leads to apparently incomprehensible 
distinctions in cases and to invalidation of some legitimate servitudes.” Id. at 413-14.  
 57. Professor Dan Tarlock has criticized the new approach as “jettisoning a vague, but 
useful, doctrine in favor of more unworkable and redundant invalidation standards.” Tar-
lock, supra note 13, at 805; see also Note, supra note 13.  
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sults of this research could help to inform the drafters of this new 
work about the judicial receptiveness of the servitude concepts con-
tained in the Third Restatement.58  
 Section II.A. of this Article outlines the research methodology em-
ployed for the collection and analysis of the reported case decisions 
for the period under review. The study period spans fifteen years, 
from 2000 through the end of 2014. This part also describes the clas-
sification scheme used in this study to analyze and categorize the 
way each case discussed and utilized the Third Restatement in reach-
ing its decision. Section II.B. describes the patterns in judicial deci-
sions mentioning the Third Restatement since 2000. This part has 
both quantitative and qualitative aspects. It contains three compo-
nents: 1) Identifying the frequency and distribution of judicial cita-
tion and discussion of Restatement provisions, 2) Categorizing the 
character of the judicial discussion according to a series of classifica-
tions describing the courts’ use of the Restatement, and 3) Analyzing 
which parts of the Restatement have received the most and the least 
judicial attention. Finally, Section III of the Article addresses a num-
ber of related issues. Has the Restatement actually accomplished the 
goals that its drafters sought to achieve? Has the Restatement been 
an effective agent of law reform affecting this area of the common 
law? Is there something exceptional about the common law of proper-
ty that makes it resistant to overarching reform through Restate-
ments ?  Has the Restatement been effective in other less measurable 
ways in changing the thinking of practitioners, scholars, and stu-
dents in their approach to the common law of servitudes? 
A.   Research Design and Methodology 
1.   Building the Third Restatement Case Decision Database 
 The main purpose of this research project has been to determine 
the extent to which courts have used the Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes in their case decisionmaking. To achieve this 
goal, the project attempted to identify all reported case decisions pub-
lished in both state and federal courts mentioning the Third Re-
                                                                                                                                        
 58. With Professor Henry E. Smith of the Harvard Law School as the Reporter, the 
ALI announced this new Restatement project early in 2015. The purpose of the new under-
taking was described in the following way: “This Restatement seeks to bring comprehen-
siveness and coherence to American property law. Subjects to be covered include the classi-
fication of entitlements, possession, accession, and acquisition; ownership powers; protec-
tion of and limits on ownership; divided and shared ownership; title and transfer; ease-
ments, servitudes, and land use; and public rights and takings.” Am. L. Inst., Restatement 
of the Law Fourth, Property, https://www.ali.org/projects/show/property/ 
[https://perma.cc/FH5Q-A3JF]. The breadth of this project is quite broad, and its coverage 
includes “easements and servitudes.” See id.  
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statement since its final adoption in 2000.59 The Westlaw electronic 
case law database was utilized to identify these case decisions using 
the words “Restatement,” “Third,” “Property,” and “Servitudes.”60 
Once a relevant case was identified and its text was collected using 
the Westlaw search method, it was added to the project’s chronologi-
cally organized database. Each of the decisions in the database was 
then analyzed for references to the Restatement within the factual 
context of the case. This information about the Restatement was then 
entered into an Excel spreadsheet.61 If a court discussed more than 
one Restatement section in a single case, separate entries were en-
tered for each section, resulting in some cases having multiple en-
tries on the spreadsheet. This method allowed for a greater under-
standing of how courts treated different Restatement sections in  
one opinion.  
 To ensure the accuracy and completeness of this survey and to 
have a high confidence that all reported cases were included in the 
study’s database, cross-checking methods were employed.62 In order 
to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the case collection meth-
od described above, alternative search queries and search methods 
were employed in order to locate additional cases referencing the Re-
statement (Third) of Property: Servitudes. Also, other annotated 
sources were consulted to assure that no relevant case decisions were 
missed. In addition, the categorization of the judicial use of the Third 
Restatement was also cross-checked after initial processing in an ef-
fort to ensure consistency in the case classifications.63 The goal of this 
                                                                                                                                        
 59. The research also collected a limited number of case decisions (fifty-three) prior to 
2000, which cited early drafts of the Restatement in judicial opinions. These decisions rep-
resented approximately 5% of the total number of opinions located and represented four 
decisions per year. The peak year of pre-2000 federal decisions mentioning the Restate-
ment was 1998 when thirty-three decisions, or 60% of the total, were rendered. 
 60. The Westlaw research query was “Advanced: (Restatement /s Third /s Property /s 
Servitude).” 
 61. The collected data from each case included: 1) The case name and full citation, 2) 
The case factual summary, 3) The state in which the case arose, 4) The level of the court 
deciding the case, 5) The section of the Restatement the court discussed, 6) Whether the 
court’s treatment of the Restatement was positive, negative, or neutral, 7) Whether the 
Restatement affected the outcome, and 8) Whether other cases were referenced by the 
court that used the Restatement. 
 62. In order to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the principal case collection 
method, alternative search queries and search methods were employed in order to locate 
cases referencing the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes that had been missed. 
These methods included: 1) Using the search query “Restatement /s Property,” and search-
ing for any case using the “Third Restatement of Property (Servitudes),” and 2) Browsing 
the sections of the Third Restatement on Westlaw, and comparing the citations with cases 
on the existing database. These methods identified a small number of cases that had been 
omitted by the original search inquiry. These additional cases were added to the existing 
Excel spreadsheet and analyzed using the same method described in footnote 61. 
 63. To ensure consistency in the case classifications, multiple reviewers classified the 
database of case decisions. This cross-check occasionally revealed inconsistencies in some of 
156  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:143 
   
collection and analytical process was to compile an accurate list of 
case decisions throughout the state and federal courts in the United 
States during the research period.  
2.   Classification of the Judicial Reaction to the Third Restatement 
 Once the case decisions mentioning the Third Restatement were 
assembled into a chronological database, each case was analyzed and 
an assessment was made as to how the Third Restatement had been 
considered by the reviewing court. All cases were classified on the 
basis of the court’s use and reliance upon the Third Restatement in 
reaching its decision. This was described as the ‘degree of impact’ 
that the Third Restatement had on the case decision. The classifiers 
were spread over six levels in a spectrum spanning from negative 
treatment, to neutral/no effect, to positive treatment. These assigned 
classifications attempted to describe the degree of impact that the 
Third Restatement had on the reasoning and the outcome of the case. 
These six classifications are as follows: 
 Six identifiers were attached to describe this range of effects in 
the following pattern: 
 Negative Classifications: 
1. The Court Expressly Declined to Adopt the Third Re-
statement (Declined to adopt) 
2. The Court Distinguished the Third Restatement from 
Prevailing Law (Distinguished)  
 Neutral Classifications: 
3. The Third Restatement Had No Positive or Negative Ef-
fect on the Decision (No effect)  
 Positive Classifications: 
4. The Third Restatement Had a Small Effect on the Deci-
sion (Small effect)  
5. The Third Restatement Had an Influential Effect on the 
Decision (Influential effect) 
6. The Court Relied Heavily on the Text of the Third Re-
statement in Its Decision (Heavy reliance / Great effect)  
                                                                                                                                        
the case classification results. In these situations, the researchers conducted more checks 
to determine the most appropriate case classification. When the cross-checker and the orig-
inal researcher agreed and came to the same designation, the designation was left as it 
was. However, if the cross-checking researcher disagreed, a third researcher, who had not 
previously reviewed the case decision, then acted as a tie-breaker. In most cases, the dif-
ferences in classification only involved adjacent scores on a five-point scale.  
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 In the section below, these six case classifications will be defined 
with examples provided from a representative sample of case deci-
sions to illustrate each of the identifying labels. 
3.   Explaining the Typology of ‘Degree of Impact on Outcome’ 
Classifications 
 Categorizing the effect of the Restatement on the identified 
cases required that each decision be evaluated with an eye to 
gauging the significance of the Restatement on the holding in the 
case. An individual assessment of the amount of effect was made 
in each case to determine the influence of the Restatement on the 
outcome. A serious effort was made to achieve substantial con-
sistency across the large number of case decisions under review. 
 
 Negative Classifications 
1. Declined to adopt: This is the most negative designation ap-
plied to a case decision. When this identifier is used, the court actual-
ly employs the terms “we decline to adopt” or “we decline to follow,” 
or something similar, with reference to the Third Restatement. This 
category requires an express and otherwise clear rejection of the Re-
statement or a Restatement section in the text of the case decision. 
Courts may state that the Third Restatement “does not conform” 
with the law of the jurisdiction.64 The depth or complexity of treat-
ment does not matter so long as the court ultimately rejects the Re-
statement in its holding.65  
2. Distinguished: This classification applies when a judicial 
opinion chose not to apply a Restatement section to decide the case. 
This label applies when a court decided that the Restatement ap-
proach was not applicable to the matter before it but did not express-
ly reject it as a matter of law.66 
   
                                                                                                                                        
 64. See, e.g., Teitel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2003). 
 65. The court in Alligood v. LaSaracina rejected the Restatement provision in favor of 
the Connecticut majority approach, stating that “[l]ike many of the jurisdictions faced with 
this question, we believe that the attributes of the majority rule, namely, uniformity, sta-
bility, predictability and judicial economy, outweigh any increased flexibility offered by the 
Restatement approach.” 999 A.2d 836, 839 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); see also Little Mountain 
Cmty. Ass’n, v. S. Columbia Corp., 92 A.3d 1191, 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014); Riverview 
Cmty. Grp. v. Spencer & Livingston, 295 P.3d 258, 260 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); MacMeekin 
v. Low Income Hous. Inst., Inc., 45 P.3d 570, 571 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).  
 66. See, e.g., Rie v. Linde, No. MMXCV106003497S, 2013 WL 593868, at *5 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2013); see also Clinger v. Hartshorn, 89 P.3d 462, 468 (Colo. App. 2003); 
Shaff v. Leyland, 914 A.2d 1240, 1245 (N.H. 2006); Sheppard v. Justin Enters., 646 S.E.2d 
177, 179 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007); R.C.R., Inc. v. Deline, 190 P.3d 140, 152 (Wyo. 2008).  
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 Neutral Classification 
3. No effect: The portion of the opinion citing the Restatement 
section has neither a positive nor a negative effect on the outcome of 
the case.67 For instance, this can happen if a court relies on another 
legal authority in deciding a case. Alternatively, this classification 
applies when a court has cited the Restatement section in either a 
portion of the dissenting or concurring opinion but not the main opin-
ion in the case.68 For example, an appellate court might mention the 
Restatement section, but note that the parties did not make an ar-
gument relevant to that Restatement section.69 It also applies when a 
court finds the Restatement provision to be irrelevant to the contro-
versy at hand.70 
   
Positive Classifications 
4. Small effect: The court mentions the Restatement section only 
in passing. This label applies when a court directly cites the Re-
statement, but the influence of the section is so minor that it does not 
have a substantial effect on the case. This might occur when a court 
briefly mentions the Restatement while explaining a general theory 
of property law, quotes from the text, or discusses it in the context of 
existing case law. If a source materially affects the outcome of the 
case, it cannot be given the small effect designation.71  
5. Influential effect: The court opinion uses the Restatement 
section to reach a conclusion, but the judicial opinion lacks an ex-
tended doctrinal discussion concerning the application of the Re-
statement. This is the most difficult category of cases to define, but 
the general rule is that it provides a middle ground between the 
‘small effect’ and ‘heavy reliance’ positive classifications. The desig-
nation applies when the Restatement influences the overall outcome 
of the case. However, for a case to be classified as ‘influential’ (as op-
posed to a ‘heavy reliance’ case), the court will not have solely ana-
lyzed the case through the Restatement, and may have otherwise 
failed to discuss the doctrine behind the Restatement section with 
                                                                                                                                        
 67. First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 
1133-34 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 68. Sec’y of Labor, Mine Safety & Health Admin. v. Nat’l Cement Co. of Cal., 494 F.3d 
1066, 1078-79 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Aragon v. Brown, 78 P.3d 913, 914-20 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). 
 69. See, e.g., BP W. Coast Prods. LLC v. SKR Inc., No. C11-6074 MJP, 2013 WL 
5212040, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 17, 2013). 
 70. Clark v. Mead Realty Grp., Inc., 854 N.E.2d 972, 977 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).  
 71. Puckett v. St. Andrews Place Ret. Cmty., Inc., No. 2010-CA-001728-MR, 2012 WL 
1072418, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2012); Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 
46 A.3d 473 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012); Barge v. Sadler, 70 S.W.3d 683, 687 (Tenn. 2002). 
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depth. Cases receiving the influential designation may involve multi-
ple citations to the same section, or long, extensive quotes.72  
6. Heavy reliance / Great effect: The cited section of the Re-
statement heavily influences the holding of the case, with the court 
engaging in an extended doctrinal discussion interpreting or rejecting 
existing law in favor of the Restatement position. The ‘heavy reliance’ 
identifier occurs when a court clearly relies on the Restatement to 
make its decision. This can happen when the court expressly adopts 
the section or discusses the Restatement in depth.73 However, a court 
need not expressly adopt the Restatement in order for the case to re-
ceive the heavy reliance label. Cases may include lengthy quotes, ex-
amples, or long discussions of the Restatement.74 
 It should be noted that the actual difference between ‘small,’ ‘in-
fluential,’ and ‘great effect’ was often a matter of degree turning on 
small differences in the weighting of these definitions. 
B.   Assessing the Patterns in Judicial Opinions Discussing the Third 
Restatement 
1.   Identifying the Frequency and Distribution of Judicial Citation 
and the Discussion of the Third Restatement 
 The database of case decisions making reference to the Third Re-
statement focused on the period from 2000 to 2014, since the Re-
statement was issued in final form in the year 2000. During this pe-
riod of time, there were a total of 1013 specific references to sections 
of the Third Restatement in 608 case decisions in both state and  
federal courts. 
                                                                                                                                        
 72. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kinslow, 114 So. 3d 827, 830-31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012); Price 
v. Eastham, 254 P.3d 1121, 1130 (Alaska 2011); Price v. Kravitz, No. 1 CA-CV 10-0889, 
2012 WL 1380269, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2012); Dent v. Lovejoy, 857 A.2d 952, 957-
58 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); McCormick v. LaChance, 32 A.3d 1037, 1041 (Me. 2011); Ephrata 
Area Sch. Dist. v. Cty. of Lancaster, 886 A.2d 1169, 1174 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005); Rowe v. 
Lavanway, 904 A.2d 78, 86 (Vt. 2006). 
 73. Dunning v. Buending, 247 P.3d 1145, 1149 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010). 
 74. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Brantley, 510 F.3d 1256, 1264-65 (10th Cir. 2007); Doug’s 
Elec. Serv. v. Miller, 83 S.W.3d 425, 428-29 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002); Bivens v. Mobley, 724 So. 
2d 458, 464-65 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998); Children’s Ctr. of Monmouth Cty., Inc. v. First Ener-
gy Corp., No. A-3963-10T3, 2012 WL 738595, at *6-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 8, 
2012); Khalil v. Motwani, 871 A.2d 96, 98-99 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
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federal system—representing slightly less than 12% of the total num-
ber of case decisions and references in the database.77 
 While analyzing the period commencing in 2000, when the Third 
Restatement was issued in its final form, the overall frequency of the 
1013 case mentions represents an annual average 67.5 case refer-
ences in 40.5 case decisions per year. However, when this time period 
is divided into three five-year segments the number of annual refer-
ences gradually increased from 47.6 to 79.4. Applying this three-part 
approach to the measurement of case decisions, the annual average 
rose from 25.4 to 51.4 over the fifteen-year period, indicating an in-
creasing frequency of Third Restatement references by courts over 
time.78 Considering the large and consistent volume of state and fed-
eral court decisions involving all aspects of easements, real cove-
nants, and equitable servitudes, identifying approximately sixty-
seven annual case references to the Third Restatement does not ap-
pear to reflect a high degree of judicial attention. Put into closer per-
spective, this annual average represents approximately 1.2 case deci-
sions in all state and federal courts at all levels of the judicial system. 
Although the frequency in case mentions of the Third Restatement 
has recently seen a slight uptick in the number of case references 
each year, it is fair to say that the overall impact of the Restatement 
has been modest, at best.79 While this new approach to servitudes 
                                                                                                                                        
the Restatements of the Law the common law of the jurisdiction. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1, 
§ 4 (2000); 7 N. MAR. I. CODE § 3401 (1997).  
Thirty-seven U.S. District Courts also mentioned the Third Restatement during the 
study period, along with six Bankruptcy Court and five Claims Court opinions. In 2014, the 
U.S. Supreme Court joined the list. See Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 
134 S. Ct. 1257, 1265-66 (2014) (referring to the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servi-
tudes section 1.2(1), defining the characteristics of easements).   
 77. The federal cases were both diversity and non-diversity jurisdiction cases. For 
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction cases see, for example, Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dol-
gencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1031-33 (11th Cir. 2014); Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Tr. v. 
Bayfield Cty., 649 F.3d 799, 803 (7th Cir. 2011); Dunellen, LLC v. Getty Props. Corp., 567 
F.3d 35, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2009); Eastling v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 578 F.3d 831, 837-38 n.4 
(8th Cir. 2009); Weyerhaeuser Co., 510 F.3d at 1264-65.  
 78. Over the period from 2000-2014, the annual average of Third Restatement case 
references was 67.5. However, during the five-year period from 2000-2004, the annual av-
erage was 47.6; from 2005-2009 it was 74.8; and from 2010-2014 it rose to 79.4. There was 
one aberrational year with extremely high Restatement references: in 2012 when there 
was a spike of 123 separate mentions appearing in sixty-seven case decisions. 
 79. Placed into the larger context of the total number of reported and unreported state 
court decisions, an annual average of 40.5 cases mentioning the Third Restatement repre-
sents a drop in the bucket, and a minute drop at that. Searching all cases in LexisNexis for 
all state and the District of Columbia decisions, the annual total of reported and unreport-
ed opinions was approximately 206,000 in 2005, 202,000 in 2010, and 185,000 in 2014. 
These totals did not include any federal opinions. Over this same time period, the annual 
number of case references to the Third Restatement averaged sixty-seven, representing 
approximately forty reported case decisions each year. These forty opinions and sixty-seven 
case mentions constitute a tiny fraction of the hundreds of thousands of reported American 
decisions. 
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may have been considered by courts in unreported case decisions and 
in legal arguments, it is also true that American courts have chosen 
not to refer to the text of the Third Restatement to a significant de-
gree in the fifteen years since its final issuance in 2000. 
2.   State and Regional Patterns in the Frequency of Case Deci-
sions Citing the Third Restatement 
 
 In the fifteen-year period under review, all state court systems, 
excluding Louisiana, have mentioned the Third Restatement in at 
least one of their published opinions. Over the study period, state 
court systems, on average, produced 18.5 opinions mentioning the 
Third Restatement. While reference of the Third Restatement was 
widespread, several states had unusually high numbers of case refer-
ences to the Restatement. The top ten list of such states included 
Connecticut (88), Colorado (84), Arizona (64), Massachusetts (61), 
New Jersey (54), New Mexico (38), Texas (38), Washington (36), Wis-
consin (34), and Alaska (28). This disparate group of ten states  
produced over half of all the court opinions mentioning the  
Third Restatement.  
 Focusing solely on national litigation averages may understate the 
actual effect of the Third Restatement on the law of individual states 
or regional groups of states. Although there was no general regional 
pattern in the case references observed, there did seem to be a ‘near-
by-state’ phenomenon that manifested a relatively high number of 
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references in four clusters of states.80 It is possible that litigators in 
these clustered areas employed the Third Restatement in their court 
briefs and oral arguments. Judges in adjacent jurisdictions may also 
have been aware of adjoining state case decisions, and they may have 
incorporated some of the reasoning found in out-of-state cases into 
their own decisions. Still, all of the remaining forty states tallied 
twenty-five or fewer court references to the Third Restatement over 
the fifteen-year study period, with thirty-one of these states scoring 
fifteen or fewer examples.81 The overall pattern emerging from this 
data indicates that the bulk of the references to the Third Restate-
ment have been concentrated in a limited number of jurisdictions, that 
most state and federal courts have made fleeting reference to it, and 
that they have not incorporated it into their decisions. 
3.   The Distribution of Case Decisions Reaching Different Levels 
of the Courts 
 Another important aspect of the analysis has been an examination 
of the level of the court system issuing written opinions containing 
references to the Third Restatement. Has the judicial consideration 
of the new Restatement risen from the trial courts and reached the 
highest level of the courts? Or has the Restatement been embraced 
by superior appellate courts, and they have then set the law of the 
jurisdiction for all inferior courts? An interesting pattern in case ref-
erences was identified in the data. When focusing on the trial level of 
state courts, there was rarely any mention of the Third Restatement 
in these written opinions with only 73 mentions or 7.2% of the total 
in all 606 cases. The intermediate appellate state courts had the 
largest number of references to the Restatement, with 624 or 58.5% 
of the total. Finally, state supreme courts mentioned the Restate-
ment 345 times or 32.5% of all the cases. The presence of more than 
90% of the state court references occurring in the appellate and su-
preme court level case decisions may represent the fact that litigants 
used the new Restatement in their appellate arguments and that 
these courts were willing to incorporate discussions of it in their opin-
ions. It is worth noting that even if a court were to refer to the Re-
statement in its opinion, the discussion might be fleeting or extreme-
ly brief. The analysis below will describe the ways that the courts ac-
tually dealt with the Restatement.  
                                                                                                                                        
 80. The four clusters were: 1) Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey; 2) Minne-
sota and Wisconsin; 3) Washington and Alaska; and 4) Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. 
 81. This bottom group includes: Arkansas (6), Delaware (6), Florida (7), Hawaii (6), 
Idaho (7), Indiana (1), Iowa (9), Kansas (1), Mississippi (3), Missouri (7), Nebraska (7), 
Nevada (4), New Mexico (1), New York (2), North Carolina (3), North Dakota (6), Oklaho-
ma (8), Oregon (6), Rhode Island (5), Virginia (2), and West Virginia (5). 
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 Employing an incremental weighting system allocating one point 
for Restatement mentions classified as ‘declined to adopt,’ and with 
each level adding one point and finally awarding six points for those 
mentions labeled as ‘heavy reliance / great effect,’ the analysis indi-
cates a scaled score. Taken together, the average scaled score of all 
1013 mentions in the United States was 4.18, which placed the aver-
age qualitative rating of the database close to the ‘small effect’ classi-
fication.82 This average score measuring the strength of judicial ac-
ceptance of the Restatement remained surprisingly constant over the 
full study period. When segmenting the fifteen-year span into three 
five-year segments, virtually no variation in scores was observed 
around the 4.18 mean, indicating that the courts citing the Third Re-
statement had consistently given it ‘small effect.’ Overall, the scaled 
score data reflects a modestly positive judicial view of the Restate-
ment in judicial decisions. 
5.   Comparisons of State Scaled Score Averages Reflecting Judicial 
Reception of the Third Restatement in Reported Case Decisions 
 Although the comprehensive scaled score remained flat over the 
entire fifteen-year study period, the research database revealed sig-
nificant variations in the strength of the scaled-score averages for 
each state. The highest scaled-score average was found in Nevada, 
with an average of 5.25 in Nevada’s four case decisions. The next two 
states scoring high averages were Oregon and Mississippi, both reg-
istering an average scaled score of 4.67 in 6 and 3 cases, respectively. 
These three jurisdictions had positive scaled scores clustering around 
the ‘influential’ classification for the treatment of the Restatement. It 
is noteworthy that these relatively high scores were reflected in an 
extremely small sample of approximately four cases in each state 
over a fifteen-year period. On the other end of the spectrum, West 
Virginia (4 mentions), Washington (36 mentions), and New York (2 
mentions) had scaled-score averages of 2.4, 3.5, and 3.5, respectively. 
Once again, except for Washington, the number of case decisions was 
extremely small. 
 Examining the list of the ten states with the greatest number of 
reported Restatement mentions, the scaled score exactly matched the 
overall, national scaled-score average of 4.18 registered in all juris-
dictions over the fifteen-year study period.83 This fact suggests that 
when courts make frequent mention of the Restatement, they do not 
                                                                                                                                        
 82. The relatively small sample of 53 comments from the 33 federal cases in the 1992-
1999 period yielded a slightly lower average score of 4.06, placing those judicial comments 
about the Third Restatement in the “small effect” category. 
 83. The top ten list of states with the highest number of Restatement mentions in-
cluded: Connecticut (88), Colorado (84), Arizona (64), Massachusetts (61), New Jersey (54), 
New Mexico (38), Texas (38), Washington (36), Wisconsin (34), and Alaska (28). 
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approve or disapprove of the work in any greater frequency than the 
national average.84 Focusing on the ten states with the highest posi-
tive scaled-score averages, this mean registered a score of 4.51 indi-
cating a variation of only .33 points higher than the national average 
scaled score. In comparison, viewing the bottom ten states having the 
lowest scaled scores, the average registered 3.59.85 The fact that this 
number was .59 lower that the national average scaled score of 4.18 
suggests that the jurisdictions having a negative view of the Re-
statement scored a stronger reading, which deviated farther from the 
overall mean than did the positive jurisdictions. Put another way, 
those courts disapproving of the Restatement felt stronger in their 
disapproval than did those approving of it. 
6.   Acceptance and Rejection of the Third Restatement at  
the Extremes 
 With most of the judicial references to the Restatement register-
ing a mildly positive character, with a scaled score of approximately 
4.18, it is difficult to detect a strong overall trend towards judicial 
approval or disapproval. Some case decisions have taken a clearer 
position. Which courts have enthusiastically embraced the Restate-
ment and which have clearly rejected it? Using the six-category ty-
pology described in Section I.B., the highest scaled (6-point-per-
mention) score was recorded for court opinions which demonstrated a 
‘heavy reliance / great effect’ of the Restatement, while the lowest 
scaled (1-point-per-mention) score reflected a position that expressly 
‘declined to adopt’ the work. Such court opinions reflected unequivo-
cal positions in a direct and clear fashion. 
 Reviewing the totals for these top and bottom categories of case 
comments, judges did not often reach either of these extremes. Over 
the study period there were only a total of sixty-nine case mentions 
demonstrating ‘heavy reliance / great effect’ and twenty-seven com-
ments showing a court specifically ‘declined to adopt’ the Restate-
ment, representing 9.4% of the total Restatement comments.86 Put-
ting this into perspective, the total number of these strongly affirma-
                                                                                                                                        
 84. However, within this group of ten states, the scaled score did vary somewhat, 
ranging from 3.53 to 4.47. The scaled scores were: Connecticut (4.14), Colorado (4.10), Ari-
zona (3.67), Massachusetts (4.31), New Jersey (4.24), New Mexico (4.47), Texas (4.42), 
Washington (3.53), Wisconsin (3.71), and Alaska (4.43). 
 85. These states with the lowest overall scaled-score average include: Virginia (4.0), 
South Carolina (3.82), Pennsylvania (3.74), Wisconsin (3.71), Arizona (3.67), Kansas (3.67), 
Washington (3.53), New York (3.50), the District of Columbia (3.44), and West Virginia (2.40). 
 86. This is a total of 96 case mentions out of 1013 over the fifteen-year study period. 
The federal courts were almost non-existent in this matter, showing a total of one ‘heavy 
reliance’ and one ‘decline to adopt’ ruling in both the U.S. District Courts and U.S. Courts 
of Appeals. Overwhelmingly, the federal decisions garnered mentions in the ‘small  
effect’ category. 
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tive mentions was slightly in excess of one per state over the fifteen-
year period.87 On the other end of the spectrum, even fewer jurisdic-
tions clearly rejected the Restatement in their court opinions, with 
only twenty-seven ‘decline to adopt’ opinions over the entire research 
period or about one-half of an opinion per state.88 Concentrating only 
on the opinions of the highest court of a jurisdiction, only twenty-five 
state supreme court decisions in eighteen states gave ‘heavy reliance’ 
comments.89 By comparison, a total of nine state supreme court deci-
sions in eight states ruled that they ‘declined to adopt’ the Restate-
ment.90 With these extremely low numbers of state supreme court 
opinions either expressly approving or disapproving of the Restate-
ment, it is difficult to say that the high courts have a strong interest 
in the Restatement as a new source of law. Only a few reacted in a 
strongly positive or negative fashion.91 Most states and the federal 
bench avoided these extreme classifications.92  
C.   Analysis of the Most Commonly Discussed Restatement Provisions 
 The database of case decisions revealed that ninety-two separate 
sections of the Restatement were mentioned at least one time in case 
decisions within the study period. While a broad range of sections 
were cited, courts most frequently discussed ten specific Restatement 
sections. In order of frequency, these sections are as follows: 4.1, 1.2, 
4.10, 2.17, 4.8, 2.16, 2.15, 4.9, 1.1, and 4.13.  
                                                                                                                                        
 87. The leading courts with ‘heavy reliance’ on their Restatement opinions were Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Texas, with all registering five such holdings each. 
 88. The states of Washington, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania had the most strongly nega-
tive opinions concerning the Restatement, averaging five opinions for each jurisdiction. 
 89. This represented 14% of all state supreme court decisions mentioning the Re-
statement. The judicial approval in each case usually pertained only to a single section of 
the Restatement. 
 90. This represented 5% of all state supreme court decisions mentioning the Restate-
ment. The judicial disapproval in each case usually pertained only to a single section of  
the Restatement. 
 91. Those state supreme courts using these extreme kinds of comments focused their 
attention on a limited number of Restatement sections. These courts finding ‘heavy reli-
ance’ attached that classification to sections 1.2, 2.10, 2.12, 2.13, 2.16, 4.0, 4.1, 4.8, 4.9, 
4.10, 4.11, 4.13, 6.20, 7.6, 7.7, 8.1, and 8.4. The courts ‘declining to adopt’ focused on sec-
tions 2.10, 2.12, 4.0, 4.8, 7.0, and 7.10. 
 92. During this period, nearly half of all jurisdictions had no ‘heavy reliance’ opinions 
and almost 80% had no ‘declined to adopt’ opinions at all at the state supreme court level. 
It appears that when the Restatement reached the state courts, it engendered neither a 
strongly positive nor a negative reaction. 
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 These were the most frequently used sections of the Restatement, 
representing 45% of the total of all case mentions. Three identifiable 
clusters of section mentions were observed representing over 50% of 
all the case references in the study period. The first cluster contain-
ing fundamental explanatory material—like section 1.293—appears 
on this list because it gives workable definitions that provide basic 
conceptual meaning for servitudes useful to a judicial opinion. Next, 
the segment of the Restatement concerned with setting forth the le-
gal theory justifying the creation of servitudes through non-express 
means received the second largest number of references. These may 
have been frequently referred to because of the nature of what those 
sections discuss: easements of necessity and prescription. These 
easements arise by operation of law and not through conventional 
conveyancing. As such, the basic legal theory is found in contentious 
cases where the existence of an easement is being determined and, if 
found, will be imposed upon a servient estate or tenement. Section 
4.8 was a particularly controversial section, because it advanced a 
minority approach dealing with the relocation of an existing ease-
ment.94 Thus, this view proposed to change much current property 
law theory. There were a significant number of cases that expressly 
adopted this section and a number of cases specifically declining to 
adopt it. In both instances, judges debate the pros and cons of this 
part of the Restatement in the court opinions.95  
                                                                                                                                        
 93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 94. Id. § 4.8.  
 95. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.  
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1.   Section 4.1: “Interpretation of Servitudes” 96 
 
 
 Section 4.1 sets forth two central ideas contained in the new Re-
statement: that servitudes should be interpreted so as to effectuate 
the intention of the parties to the agreement and, presumptively, the 
provisions should be enforced unless they violate values contained in 
public policy. This provision was mentioned eighty-four times in case 
decisions during the study period, making it the most frequently cit-
ed section of the Third Restatement.97 Fifty percent of those case 
mentions were classified as having a ‘small effect,’98 with an addi-
tional 25% of the references being considered ‘influential,’99and 12% 
                                                                                                                                        
 96. The text of the Restatement section 4.1 states: “(1) A servitude should be inter-
preted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in 
the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry 
out the purpose for which it was created. (2) Unless the purpose for which the servitude is 
created violates public policy, and unless contrary to the intent of the parties, a servitude 
should be interpreted to avoid violating public policy. Among reasonable interpretations, 
that which is more consonant with public policy should be preferred.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 97. This section was referred to in more than 10% of the case references to the Re-
statement during the study period. There were five additional mentions of section 4.1 in 
the pre-2000 period as well, also constituting 10% of those references. 
 98. Saastopankkien Keskus-Osake Pankki (Skopbank) v. Allen-Williams Corp., 7 F. 
Supp. 2d 601, 607 (D.V.I. 1998) (citing to section 4.1 in the context of another source). An-
other example of a ‘small effect’ use is found in Lewitz v. Porath Family Trust, 36 P.3d 120, 
122 (Colo. App. 2001), where the court cites to section 4.1 to explain a very basic principle.  
 99. In Deane v. Kahn, 88 A.3d 1230, 1239 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014), the court dealt with 
an issue as to the existence of an express easement. In that case, the court looked specifically 
at section 4.1, comment d, which clearly influenced the court’s decision without heavily rely-
ing on the section in general. See also Coll. Book Ctrs., Inc. v. Carefree Foothills Homeowners’ 
Ass’n, 241 P.3d 897, 901 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (using section 4.1 in an ‘influential’ manner 
stating: “We interpret restrictive covenants in accordance with the Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Servitudes § 4.1(1) (2000),” but substantially relying on state law precedent). 
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reaching the level of ‘heavy reliance.’100 In 10% of uses (9 cases), the 
use of section 4.1 had ‘no effect’ on the outcome.101 In one case, the 
court ‘distinguished’ section 4.1, and courts ‘declined to adopt’ section 
4.1 twice.102 Conversely, the section was expressly adopted 11 times 
(or 12.5% of cases adopted it). However, after examining the fifteen-
year period, no clear pattern of increasing or decreasing judicial use 
emerged. Interestingly, one state, Arizona, was the most likely juris-
diction to use section 4.1, referring to it eleven times out of sixty-
three references to the Restatement making section 4.1 more than 
17% of the Restatement references in Arizona courts.  
                                                                                                                                        
 100. See, e.g., Powell v. Washburn, 125 P.3d 373, 377-78 (Ariz. 2006) (en banc). The 
Powell case expressly adopted section 4.1 and ‘heavily relied’ on it. Id. The case very clearly 
adopts the Restatement section (“We adopt the Restatement approach . . . .”) and then pro-
vides three reasons for adopting it. Id. at 377. Similarly, Nature Conservancy of Wis., Inc. 
v. Altnau, adopts section 4.01 and ‘heavily relies’ on it. 756 N.W.2d 641, 644-48 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2008). In that case, the court discusses sections 4.1 and 4.5 concurrently, relying 
heavily on both sections to reach a legal conclusion, and in so doing, explicitly states that 
they are adopting the Restatement approach. Id. at 646. 
 101. Section 4.1 has a large number of ‘no effect’ cases (10%, or 9 cases). For example, 
City of Arkansas City v. Bruton, cites to section 4.1 multiple times in the context of fram-
ing the argument by the City. 137 P.3d 508, 514 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006). However, in that 
case, the court held that the City’s argument was incorrect, and that there was no evidence 
that the City’s citation to section 4.1 had any impact, positive or negative, on the outcome 
of the case. Id.  
 102. In Joiner v. Southwest Central Rural Electric Co-operative Corp., the court ‘de-
clined to adopt’ section 4.1. 786 A.2d 349, 351-52 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). In this case, the 
court overturned the lower court’s decision, which was based on sections 4.01 and 4.11. The 
lower court had expressly adopted section 4.11, but the appellate court noted that the Re-
statement was not expressly adopted in Pennsylvania and declined to adopt it in this case. Id.  
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2.   Section 1.2: “Easement and Profit Defined” 103 
 
 Section 1.2 is a definitional provision setting forth basic aspects of 
easements and profits á prendre.104 These two forms of servitudes 
were traditionally recognized by the common law. Easements allow 
use to be made of another’s land, while profits allow some natural 
resource to be taken from such land.105 Section 1.2 had the second 
most frequent citation count with seventy-one uses in court decisions 
representing 7% of the total. As the chart above indicates, 76% of sec-
tion 1.2 mentions were ‘small effect’ with only one decision ‘heavily 
relying’ on it.106 Often, the section was used to define and support the 
                                                                                                                                        
 103. The text of the Restatement section 1.2 states: “(1) An easement creates a nonpos-
sessory right to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor 
not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement. (2) A profit á prendre is an 
easement that confers the right to enter and remove timber, minerals, oil, gas, game, or 
other substances from land in the possession of another. It is referred to as a ‘profit’ in this 
Restatement. (3) The burden of an easement or profit is always appurtenant. The benefit 
may be either appurtenant or in gross. (4) As used in this Restatement, the term ‘ease-
ment’ includes an irrevocable license to enter and use land in the possession of another and 
excludes a negative easement. A negative easement is included in the term ‘restrictive cove-
nant’ defined in § 1.3.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 104. Section 1.2 was often used in case opinions to define easements. For example, in 
Martin Drive Corp. v. Thorsen, 786 A.2d 484, 489 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001), the court briefly 
used section 1.2 to provide a definition. It also referred to section 1.2, comment d, to help 
explain nonpossessory interests in conjunction with two other case citations. Id. Profits á 
prendre, the right of taking natural resources from land, were far less frequently included 
in section 1.2 cases.  
 105. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, at 435, 437. 
 106. Marcus Cable Associates, L.P. v Krohn, 90 S.W.3d 697, 700-03 (Tex. 2002), was 
the only case classified as heavily relying upon the section. Marcus Cable is an important 
easement case, widely cited in a number of other jurisdictions. In that case, section 1.2 was 
cited multiple times for multiple purposes. For instance, it was used to provide definitional 
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text of an opinion.107 As such, section 1.2 usually confirmed the mean-
ing of an existing common law property term. No use of section 1.2 
was considered ‘negative,’ thus, no case neither expressly declined to 
adopt the provision nor expressly adopted section 1.2. This is hardly 
surprising due to the definitional nature of the section and the close-
ness of its fit with general, common law decisions. Viewing the fre-
quency of case references, the number of uses per year appears to be 
slowly increasing, although rising from a low base. This section was 
primarily used by state appellate and supreme courts, though it did 
appear in five trial court cases and three federal cases. Most signifi-
cantly, section 1.2 was the section of the Restatement that the U.S. 
Supreme Court cited in Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United 
States, the sole high court reference to the Restatement.108  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
information. Id. at 700 (“[u]nlike a possessory interest in land, an easement is a nonposses-
sory interest that authorizes its holder to use the property for only particular purposes.”). 
The section was also used to explain that changes in the use of the dominant parcel must 
be within the purpose of the original easement. Id. at 701. The section was used to help 
reach the conclusion that “an express easement encompasses only those technological de-
velopments that further the particular purpose for which the easement was granted.” Id. at 
701-02. Finally, section 1.2 was used in conjunction with several other Restatement sec-
tions, including sections 4.2 and 4.10. Id.  
 107. ‘Small effect’ was the most common designation for section 1.2. Often, this desig-
nation was given because section 1.2 was part of a string of citations sometimes containing 
parenthetical quotations or explanations from the Restatement. See, e.g., Hanna v. Robin-
son, 167 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (providing section 1.2 as part of a string 
citation without any further information included); Quintain Dev. v. Columbia Nat. Res., 
556 S.E.2d 95, 102 (W. Va. 2001) (providing a quote from section 1.2 but only as a “see al-
so ”  in a string of citations).  
 108. 134 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2014) (the Court’s consideration was classified as an ‘influ-
ential’ usage of section 1.2). In Brandt, the Supreme Court used the section to define an 
easement before using one of the Restatement comments to explain that abandonment can 
unilaterally terminate an easement. Id. at 1265-66. The Restatement section was discussed 
alongside a number of cases, although the common principles expressed in the section, and 
cited by the Court, clearly influenced the Court’s decision.  
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3.   Section 4.10: “Use Rights Conferred by a Servitude” 109 
 
 Section 4.10 specifies the rights held by the owner of the easement 
or profit over the land burdened by the servitude. Consistent with 
prior sections, this provision allows the parties to freely negotiate the 
exact terms of use in the creation of the easement or profit. However, 
in the absence of such a specific description of rights, section 4.10 
presumptively allows for a level of use that “is reasonably necessary 
for the convenient enjoyment of the servitude.”110 While this language 
does not provide great clarity, it does suggest that easement or profit 
rights should be presumptively interpreted to serve their underlying 
purpose. Furthermore, section 4.10 sets forth a general principle al-
lowing for the modification of a servitude, permitting the dominant 
parcel to be used for the easement or profit in such a way as to be 
benefitted by future technological changes and to promote its “normal 
development.”111 This expansionist emphasis was limited by a con-
                                                                                                                                        
 109. The text of the Restatement section 4.10 states: “Except as limited by the terms of 
the servitude determined under § 4.1, the holder of an easement or profit as defined in § 
1.2 is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for the 
convenient enjoyment of the servitude. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the use 
may change over time to take advantage of developments in technology and to accommo-
date normal development of the dominant estate or enterprise benefited by the servitude. 
Unless authorized by the terms of the servitude, the holder is not entitled to cause unrea-
sonable damage to the servient estate or interfere unreasonably with its enjoyment.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.10 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Concepts of intent effectuation and the encouragement of efficient land use have 
been part of American land use law for centuries. The “normal development” doctrine has 
been recognized in servitude case law and was incorporated into the earlier Restatement  
in section 484. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 484 (AM. LAW INST. 1944). Other case 
decisions have accorded the easement owner a right to unlimited “reasonable” use of the 
174  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:143 
   
cept of “unreasonable” damage and interference with the servient 
land.112 Determining the point at which such damage occurs would be 
left to courts considering excessive use claims by servient owners. 
 Section 4.10 was mentioned by courts fifty-six times representing 
5.5% of the total number of court mentions in the sample. In general, 
the judicial discussion of section 4.10 was positive and supportive 
with 43% of the references classified as having ‘small effect,’113 34% 
classified as ‘influential,’114 and 16% classified as ‘heavy reliance.’115 
This ‘heavy reliance’ comprised of 93% of all the judicial treatment 
and constituted a particularly positive acceptance by the courts. As is 
typical, the overwhelming majority (91%) of these cases were decided 
by appellate or state supreme courts. Connecticut was the state hav-
ing the most frequent use of section 4.10, using it ten times in its case 
decisions. This high degree of use of section 4.10 is also consistent 
with Connecticut’s first place position as the state with the highest 
number of Restatement references.  
                                                                                                                                        
servient estate. See Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Kimberlin, 994 P.2d 1114, 1118-21 (Mont. 
2000). See generally, KORNGOLD, supra note 6, at 136-40.  
 112. The Restatement ’s comments indicate that what might be considered “normal 
development” could change over time and “what may be abnormal development at one time 
may become normal at a later time.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.10 
cmt. f, illus. 14-16 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 113. See Weeks v. Wolf Creek Indus., 941 So. 2d 263, 270-73 (Ala. 2006)  
(referencing section 4.10 multiple times, but each use was part of a string cite); see also 
Holmstrom v. Lee, 26 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (mentioning section 4.10 in con-
junction with another source, which used a parenthetical example taken from section 4.10).  
 114. See PARC Holdings, Inc. v. Killian, 785 A.2d 106, 114-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(quoting from comment d of section 4.10 and using an illustration from it to assist in decid-
ing the case).  
 115. In Mattson v. Montana Power Co., 215 P.3d 675, 689-92 (Mont. 2009), the court 
both expressly adopted section 4.10 and ‘heavily relied’ on it in its opinion. In that case, 
there was an easement allowing a dam operation to flood the servient property, and a 
question arose as to whether the easement owners were “required not to cause unreasona-
ble damage to, or interfere unreasonably with the enjoyment of, the Landowners’ proper-
ties?” Id. at 680. The case found that section 4.10 would suggest that the owners were not 
allowed to cause unreasonable damage, unless the easement states otherwise. Id. at 689. 
In Mattson, the court provided a lengthy discussion on section 4.10, clearly adopting it, and 
applying it directly to the facts. Id. at 690; see also Schugg v. Gila River Indian Cmty. (In 
re Schugg), No. CV-05-02045-PHX-JAT, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67841, at *17-18 (D. Ariz. 
May 15, 2014) (noting that “[i]n the absence of contrary precedent, Arizona follows the 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes . . . .”). 
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4.   Section 2.17: “Servitudes Created by Prescription” 116 
 
 Section 2.17 reflects the legal concept that easements and profits 
may be created by operation of law through principles of adverse use 
or prescription. These methods have long existed for the acquisition 
of fee simple title, but an equally long tradition exists for the earning 
of an easement through similar prescriptive use. Although a few 
courts have questioned the wisdom of prescriptive legal theory in the 
modern context,117 prescriptive easements continue to be recognized 
throughout the nation.118 
 Over the period of review, section 2.17 was mentioned by courts 
fifty-seven times with 55% of those uses being considered ‘small ef-
fect,’119 32% considered ‘influential,’120 and only 5% finding ‘heavy re-
                                                                                                                                        
 116. The text of Restatement section 2.17 states: “A servitude is created by a prescriptive 
use of land, as that term is defined in § 2.16, if the prescriptive use is: (1) open or notorious, and 
(2) continued without effective interruption for the prescriptive period. Periods of prescriptive 
use may be tacked together to make up the prescriptive period if there is a transfer between the 
prescriptive users of either the inchoate servitude or the estate benefited by the inchoate servi-
tude.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 117. See Potts v. Burnette, 273 S.E.2d 285, 288 (N.C. 1981); Butterfly Realty v. James 
Romanella & Sons, Inc., 93 A.3d 1022, 1030 (R.I. 2014); O’Dell v. Stegall, 703 S.E.2d 561, 
570 (W. Va. 2010). 
 118. JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN 
LAND § 5:1, at 5-7 (2014) (“[T]he doctrine of prescription remains a major force in contem-
porary real property law.”). 
 119. The majority of references to section 2.17 have been classified as having ‘small 
effect.’ A good example of ‘small effect’ reliance can be found in Stone v. Perkins, 795 
N.E.2d 583, 586 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003), which briefly mentions section 2.17 comment h, 
alongside Massachusetts case law, to support the idea that right of way easements by pre-
scription must follow the same confined route as the prescriptive use. Although it was re-
ferred to by the court, the Restatement’s usage only had a ‘small effect.’ See also Sand-
maier v. Tahoe Dev. Grp., Inc., 887 A.2d 517, 519 (Me. 2005) (referencing section 2.17, 
comment e for further support in addition to state law precedent). 
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liance.’121 In a single case, section 2.17 had ‘no effect’ (2%) and in an-
other it was ‘distinguished.’ Two cases ‘declined to adopt’ section 2.17 
(4%).122 Following the general pattern observed in all the cases, the 
overwhelming majority of these decisions were found at the level of 
state appellate (75%) and state supreme courts (16%). There was no 
clear trend in the number of uses each year, and no states had an 
abnormally large number of references to section 2.17.  
                                                                                                                                        
 120. O’Dell, 703 S.E.2d at 576, 578, provides an example of an influential use of the 
Restatement section 2.17. In O’Dell, a landlocked property owner argued for a prescriptive 
easement for the use of a gravel lane. Id. at 574. The court provided an extensive discus-
sion of prescriptive easements, along with state precedent and other secondary sources. 
The court selected long quotes from section 2.17, comment c to explain the purpose of pre-
scriptive easements and section 2.17, comment g to emphasize the current lack of con-
sistency and clarity in the doctrine of prescriptive easements. Id. at 576, 578; see also 
Hamad Assam Corp. v. Novotny, 737 N.W.2d 922, 926 (S.D. 2007). 
 121. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Brantley, 510 F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2007) (ad-
dressing the adverse use of land by a party who was grazing his animals on another’s 
land). In Algermissen v. Sutin, 61 P.3d 176, 180 (N.M. 2002), the court expressly  
adopted section 2.17 along with the related section 2.16. In this case, the court chose to 
fully adopt the approach that the Restatement had taken with regard to prescriptive ease-
ments. Id. Another case that expressly adopted section 2.17 is Burciaga Segura v. Van 
Dien, 344 P.3d 1009, 1011-12 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014), which, like the Algermissen case, also 
adopted section 2.16. In Burciaga, the state appellate court described the Algermissen 
opinion as binding precedent. Burciaga, 344 P.3d at 1011. 
 122. Trask v. Nozisko, 134 P.3d 544, 553 (Colo. App. 2006) (noting that the adoption of 
one section of the Restatement (section 2.16) does not result in the adoption of the entire 
Restatement and holding that the court was refusing to adopt section 2.17 as precedent); 
see also Walker v. Hollinger, 968 P.2d 661, 665 (Idaho 1998) (declining to adopt section 
2.17 and relying instead on existing state law precedent). 
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5.   Section 4.8: “Location, Relocation, and Dimensions of  
a Servitude” 123 
 
 Section 4.8 was a significant part of the Restatement, which at-
tempted to clarify a complex part of easement law relating to the ini-
tial location and later relocation of an existing easement. While al-
lowing for the instrument creating the easement to control the loca-
tion of the use, in the absence of such a provision, section 4.8 empow-
ers the servient estate owner to physically select a “reasonable” place 
where the easement’s owner may lawfully use the servient land. This 
position is consistent with the underlying property law in many ju-
risdictions.124 It is a practically important principle because many 
documents creating servitudes merely describe a permitted use with-
out specifically noting a precise location where the owner’s use rights 
may be exercised.  
 Furthermore, section 4.8 authorizes the servient owner to relocate 
the easement “to permit normal use or development” of the servient 
                                                                                                                                        
 123. The text of Restatement section 4.8 provides: “Except where the location and di-
mensions are determined by the instrument or circumstances surrounding creation of a 
servitude, they are determined as follows: (1) The owner of the servient estate has the right 
within a reasonable time to specify a location that is reasonably suited to carry out the 
purpose of the servitude. (2) The dimensions are those reasonably necessary for enjoyment 
of the servitude. (3) Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement, as defined  
in § 1.2, the owner of the servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes in the loca-
tion or dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner’s expense, to permit normal use 
or development of the servient estate, but only if the changes do not (a) significantly lessen 
the utility of the easement, (b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use 
and enjoyment, or (c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.8 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 124. BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 118, § 7.5, at 7-8 n.5. 
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land.125 This provision would recognize an enhanced authority in the 
servient landowner to shift a servitude’s location after it had been 
initially established. Section 4.8 does grant the easement owner some 
protection of its expectations and existing use, but, in general, this 
Restatement section appears to be inconsistent with a general rule 
barring unilateral relocation of an easement by either party. Not 
surprisingly, this proposed change has engendered a mixture of judi-
cial and scholarly responses, some of them highly negative.126  
 Even though it announced a practically important and controver-
sial provision, section 4.8 was mentioned by the courts only forty-
seven times making it the fifth most discussed section of the Re-
statement. Unlike most sections, the uses of section 4.8 were not 
classified as having a predominately ‘small effect.’ A bi-modal distri-
bution of references was observed. On the positive side, 26% of the 
case mentions were categorized as ‘influential’127 and 17% were found 
to have had ‘heavy reliance’ on this section of the Restatement.128 On 
the other hand, 26% of the case references were ‘small effect’129 while 
23% of cases ‘declined to adopt’ section 4.8.130 As such, the section trig-
gered a strong response in both directions of approval and disapproval. 
 Following the observed pattern, the vast majority of section 4.8 
cases were decided by the appellate courts (62%) or state supreme 
courts (30%). However, it should be noted that several of the cases 
(though not all of them) that were marked as expressly adopting sec-
tion 4.8 were from the same state—Massachusetts. Massachusetts 
cases also mentioned section 4.8 more frequently than any other 
                                                                                                                                        
 125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.8 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  
 126. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Georgetown Univ., 347 F.3d 941, 946-50 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003); see also Joseph S. Kakesh, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Property Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 918 (2005); 
John A. Lovett, A Bend in the Road: Easement Relocation and Pliability in the New Re-
statement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 38 CONN. L. REV. 1, 2 n.5, 8, 76 (2005); John V. 
Orth, Relocating Easements: A Response to Professor French, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 
J. 643, 654 (2004) (finding section 4.8 to be “asymmetrical and unfair”); Note, The Right of 
Owners of Servient Estates to Relocate Easements Unilaterally, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1710 
(1996) (discussing section 4.8 in the tentative draft and rejecting the Restatement approach).  
 127. Goodwin v. Johnson, 591 S.E.2d 34, 37 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003); Stanga v. Husman, 
694 N.W.2d 716, 718-19 (S.D. 2005). 
 128. Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude’s Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1239 (Colo. 2001); M.P.M. 
Builders, LLC v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1056-59 (Mass. 2004) (displaying strong support 
of the Restatement ’ s position). 
 129. Wells v. Sanor, 151 S.W.3d 819, 823-24 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).  
 130. Crisp v. VanLaecken, 122 P.3d 926, 929 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (fearing that the 
Restatement position could cause “endless litigation between property owners”); Mac-
Meekin v. Low Income Housing Inst., Inc., 45 P.3d 570, 577, 579 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) 
(rejecting the Restatement approach and finding it a “minority” position).  
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state, referring to the section a total of nine times, representing 
roughly 20% of its section Restatement references.131  
6.   Section 2.16: “Servitudes Created by Prescription:  
Prescriptive Use” 132 
 
 This section of the Restatement should be read in conjunction with 
the sections immediately surrounding it, which were also frequently 
discussed in court opinions. These provisions describe the legal theo-
ry recognizing the creation of servitudes that do not originate in ex-
press, written agreements.133  
 Section 2.16 was mentioned by courts thirty-seven times in an 
evenly distributed pattern over the study period. The majority of 
those uses were considered ‘small effect’ (57%),134 with 13% consid-
                                                                                                                                        
 131. See, e.g., M.P.M. Builders, LLC v. Dwyer, 809 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (Mass. 2004); 
Carlin v. Cohen, 895 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008); Trenz v. Town of Norwell, 861 
N.E.2d 777, 783-84 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); Kitras v. Town of Aquinnah, 833 N.E.2d 157, 
166 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). 
 132. The text of Restatement section 2.16 states: “A prescriptive use of land that meets 
the requirements set forth in § 2.17 creates a servitude. A prescriptive use is either (1) a 
use that is adverse to the owner of the land or the interest in land against which the servi-
tude is claimed, or (2) a use that is made pursuant to the terms of an intended but imper-
fectly created servitude, or the enjoyment of the benefit of an intended but imperfectly 
created servitude.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.16 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 133. Sections 2.10 through 2.18, dealing with the creation of non-express servitudes 
through the legal theories of estoppel, implication, prior use, map or boundary reference, 
general plan, and necessity or prescription was the most frequently discussed Restatement 
section cluster registering 229 mentions or nearly 23% of all case references. 
 134. ‘Small effect’ uses of section 2.16 include Thompson v. E.I.G. Palace Mall, LLC, 
where the court used section 2.16 to provide a very basic description of prescriptive ease-
ments. 657 N.W.2d 300, 303 (S.D. 2003). Ultimately, the court relied on its own case law to 
determine whether a prescriptive easement actually exists. Id. at 304. 
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ered ‘influential,’135 and 14% considered ‘heavy reliance.’136 Converse-
ly, section 2.16 had ‘no effect’ in two cases and one case declined to 
adopt it.137 Three cases (8%) distinguished section 2.16. Colorado was 
the jurisdiction with the greatest number of section 2.16 references 
with eight or 22% of the total mentions. Consistent with the other 
sections, the majority of the case references (65%) were made by an 
appellate court, while 24% were issued by a state supreme court.  
                                                                                                                                        
 135. See Brown v. Faatz, 197 P.3d 245, 250-51 (Colo. App. 2008), where the appellate 
court mentioned section 2.16 in two multiple-source citations. The Brown court used a long 
quote from comment g of section 2.16 to explain overcoming the presumption of adverse 
use. Id. at 250. The repeated references to comment g of section 2.16, along with the dis-
cussion relevant to unenclosed land, indicate that section 2.16 was ‘influential’ to this deci-
sion. Another example of an ‘influential’ usage of section 2.16 is found in Kadlec v. Dorsey, 
No. 2 CA-CV 2013-0020, 2013 WL 5460136, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2013), where the 
appeals court noted that section 2.16 had been relied upon by the trial court. Id. The appel-
late court considered section 2.16 and concluded that the trial court’s interpretation of the 
comments was incorrect regarding whether necessity bars adverse use for prescriptive 
easements. Id. It then considered another section of the Restatement, and, taken in combi-
nation, these references clearly influenced the court’s overall decision. Id. See also Gamboa 
v. Clark, 321 P.3d 1236, 1245-47 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014).  
 136. Two cases expressly adopted section 2.16. See Algermissen v. Sutin, 61 P.3d 176, 
180 (N.M. 2002) (updating the law and adopting section 2.16 in conjunction with section 
2.17 and section 2.18); Burciaga Segura v. Van Dien, 344 P.3d 1009, 1011-12 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 2014) (expressly following the Restatement and the prior state supreme court Al-
germissen decision). In Algermissen, the court found a prescriptive easement because the 
parties attempted, but technically failed, to create an express easement, and they had acted 
as though an easement existed for an extended period of time. Algermissen, 61 P.3d at 183. 
 137. In Allen v. Woelfel Family Revocable Trust, No. 2013AP2420, 2014 WL 2050823, 
at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. May 20, 2014) (also available without pagination at 848 N.W.2d 905), 
the court declined to adopt section 2.16. In that case, one party was arguing that a pre-
scriptive easement existed, despite evidence of permissive use, using section 2.16 (which 
allows prescriptive easements when the parties previously tried to establish, and intended 
to establish, an easement but technically failed). The appeals court declined to apply sec-
tion 2.16, due to the fact that the Restatement ’ s position that a permissive use (even if it 
was a failed attempt to create a servitude) could satisfy prescription was inconsistent with 
state law. Id. 
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7.   Section 2.15: “Servitudes Created by Necessity”138 
 
 This section concerns a form of non-express easement that arises 
by virtue of either economic necessity or unexpressed intention. The 
common law legal theory establishing this form of easement is 
longstanding and often is confused or commingled with other non-
express easement theories.139 Section 2.15 sets forth a presumptive 
principle for finding these property rights unless “the language or 
circumstances . . . clearly indicate” an opposite intention.140 This pro-
vision was the third most frequently discussed section having thirty-
four mentions, of which 71% were classified as having ’small effect,’141 
yet 26% were labeled as being ‘influential.’142 No court ‘heavily relied’ 
                                                                                                                                        
 138. The text of Restatement section 2.15 states: “A conveyance that would otherwise 
deprive the land conveyed to the grantee, or land retained by the grantor, of rights neces-
sary to reasonable enjoyment of the land implies the creation of a servitude granting or 
reserving such rights, unless the language or circumstances of the conveyance clearly indi-
cate that the parties intended to deprive the property of those rights.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.15 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 139. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, §§ 8.4-8.5, at 444-47.  
 140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.15 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 141. The most numerous uses of section 2.15 are of ‘small effect.’ For example, Barge v. 
Sadler, 70 S.W.3d 683, 686-87 (Tenn. 2002), states that “[t]hese statutes recognized neces-
sity as justification for an easement even where the common law requirements were not 
met.” This clearly had a very minimal impact on the outcome of the case. In Thompson v. 
E.I.G. Palace Mall, LLC, 657 N.W.2d 300, 305 (S.D. 2003), this section was mentioned 
briefly in a discussion of the state’s different versions of implied easements (necessity and 
prior use, comparing Restatement section 2.15 to section 2.12). Finally, the court in Reece 
v. Smith, 594 S.E.2d 654, 658 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), mentioned section 2.15 in a detailed 
string cite containing many other sources of authority. 
 142. Kitras v. Town of Aquinnah, 833 N.E.2d 157, 163-64, 166 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005), 
provides an example of an ‘influential’ use of section 2.15 since the court mentions this 
section three times in its opinion. Id. Although section 2.15 was discussed in conjunction 
with significant state case law, it clearly influenced the court’s decision in this case. See 
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on section 2.15, and one case decision expressly declined to adopt sec-
tion 2.15.143 There is no clear trend in the use of section 2.15 over 
time, other than an initial increase in usage. This might reflect the 
limited number of times section 2.15 is actually used, despite being 
one of the top seven most used Restatement sections. The majority of 
the cases (50%) come out of the state appellate courts, with 38% com-
ing from a state supreme court. A small number of cases came from a 
lower court (9% from a trial court and 3% from a claims court).  
8.   Section 4.9: “Servient Owner’s Right to Use Estate Burdened 
by a Servitude”144 
 
 This Restatement section reflects the property law principle allow-
ing the servient landowner to use the servient land for any purpose 
that does not interfere with the enjoyment of the dominant parcel. It 
creates a presumptive interpretive position that applies unless the 
parties have expressed a different intent discernable from the lan-
guage of their agreement or from the circumstances of the transac-
                                                                                                                                        
also Berge v. State, 915 A.2d 189, 194-95 (Vt. 2006) (using an extensive quote of section 
2.15, comment d to argue that the common law needs to reflect modern needs and technolo-
gy); Myers v. LaCasse, 838 A.2d 50, 56 (Vt. 2003) (using section 2.15 to help explain the mod-
ern law of easements of necessity).  
 143. Wood v. Neuman, 979 A.2d 64, 71-72 (D.C. 2009), is the only reference of section 
2.15 that declined to adopt it. In Wood, the trial court held that no easement of necessity 
existed under current law. Id. On appeal, it was argued that under section 2.15 the claim-
ant had an easement of necessity to repair a wall. Id. The appellate court expressly de-
clined to use section 2.15 to overturn the trial court’s judgment and provided no indication 
as to whether it would entertain the section under different circumstances. Id. at 72.  
 144. Restatement section 4.9 provides: “Except as limited by the terms of the servitude 
determined under § 4.1, the holder of the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the 
servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the servitude.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.9 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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tion. This is consistent with the overwhelming majority of court opin-
ions dealing with the issue of servient owner rights.145 The provision 
allows the servient landowner to make “any use” of the burdened 
land so long as such use does not “unreasonably interfere” with the 
rights of the servitude owner. The “unreasonable interference”146 
standard can be found in the law of many jurisdictions, although de-
termining what constitutes “unreasonable interference” is often a fac-
tual matter determined in a case-specific manner. Expressed as it is, 
Restatement section 4.9 appears to encourage servient parcel use. 
Set out in this way, this section attempts to define a default position 
in the law that allows both parties to achieve a balance in their re-
spective land uses that will result in maximizing its aggregate utili-
ty.147 Judicial review determines when the servient owner has gone 
too far, one way or the other.   
 The judicial treatment of section 4.9 generally received positive 
mentions in case references, with 28% being categorized as ‘influen-
tial’148 and 62% classified as having a ‘small effect.’149 The remaining 
10% of the references were evenly spread between the strongly posi-
tive and negative classifications. While the 29 case references repre-
sent a small number and a relatively small share of the total 1013 
case mentions, they do indicate a positive judicial reception. 
                                                                                                                                        
 145. BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 118, § 8:20, at 8-65 to -67 n.5 (listing a voluminous 
citation of supporting case decisions). 
 146. In Kanifolsky v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120-21 (E.D. Wash. 2005), 
while referring to Washington law and Restatement section 4.9, the U.S. District Court 
found that the servient owner’s construction of a “large, expensive house” on the burdened 
land constituted “unreasonable interference” due to the permanence of the encroachment 
and the difficulty and expense of removing it. 
 147. Some state courts have reached similar positions in their own property law deci-
sions and section 4.9 has merely confirmed these precedents. See, e.g., Lazy Dog Ranch v. 
Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1238 (Colo. 1998) (“[T]he interests of both parties 
must be balanced in order to achieve due and reasonable enjoyment of both the easement 
and the servient estate.”); Ephrata Area Sch. Dist. v. Cty. of Lancaster, 886 A.2d 1169, 
1176-77 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (allowing the servient owner to create additional servi-
tudes on the burdened land as long as they did not unreasonably interfere with the prior 
servitude holders). 
 148. See, e.g., Vandeleigh Indus., LLC v. Storage Partners of Kirkwood, LLC, 901 A.2d 
91, 100-01 (Del. 2006); Martin v. Simmons Props., LLC, 2 N.E.3d 885, 896 (Mass. 2014); 
Margerison v. Charter Oak Homeowners Ass’n, 238 P.3d 973, 977 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010). 
 149. See, e.g., Callahan v. Point Clear Holdings, Inc., 579 F.3d 1207, 1217 (11th Cir. 
2009); Matoush v. Lovingood, 177 P.3d 1262, 1270 (Colo. 2008); Zirinsky v. Carnegie Hill 
Capital Asset Mgmt., LLC, 58 A.3d 284, 290 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). 
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9.   Section 1.1: “Servitude Defined; Scope of Restatement”150  
 
 This Restatement section provides basic definitions governing the 
meaning of servitudes as used in the document. It also sets out the 
comprehensive scope for the Restatement bringing easements, prof-
its, and real covenants into one unified real property category—
servitudes. As such, this section provides the fundamental elements 
for all durable, land-based promises finding specific, enumerated ex-
clusions from the broad, general definition.151 It was not surprising 
that sections 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.5 were all mentioned in court deci-
sions in relatively high numbers due to their usefulness as clear 
statements of these property law interests. With a total of twenty-
seven case references, 74% were categorized as having a ‘small ef-
                                                                                                                                        
 150. Restatement section 1.1 provides: “(1) A servitude is a legal device that creates a 
right or an obligation that runs with land or an interest in land. (a) Running with land 
means that the right or obligation passes automatically to successive owners or occupiers of 
the land or the interest in land with which the right or obligation runs. (b) A right that 
runs with land is called a ‘benefit’ and the interest in land with which it runs may be called 
the ‘benefited’ or ‘dominant’ estate. (c) An obligation that runs with land is called a ‘burden’ 
and the interest in land with which it runs may be called the ‘burdened’ or ‘servient’ estate. 
(2) The servitudes covered by this Restatement are easements, profits, and covenants. To 
the extent that special rules and considerations apply to the following servitudes, they are 
not within the scope of this Restatement: (a) covenants in leases; (b) covenants in mortgag-
es and other property security devices; (c) profits for the removal of timber, oil, gas, and 
minerals. (3) Zoning and other public land-use regulations, the public-navigation servitude, 
the public-trust doctrine, and rights determined by riparian, littoral, prior-appropriation, or 
ground-water doctrines are not servitudes within the meaning of the term as used in this 
Restatement.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 151. Restatement section 1.1, subsections 2-3 identify a number of potential servitudes 
for exclusion from its provisions. These include lease and mortgage covenants for timber, 
oil, gas, and minerals; land use controls; navigation servitudes; riparian rights; as well as 
surface and ground water rights. Perhaps the Restatement’s intention was not to disturb 
these specific and idiosyncratic parts of state law, often having significant economic impact. 
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fect’152 and nearly 19% as being ‘influential.’153 Once again, this sec-
tion received a moderately positive judicial reception. Not surprising-
ly, very few mentions were extreme in their degree of acceptance  
or rejection. 
10.   Section 4.13: “Duties of Repair and Maintenance”154 
 
 This Restatement section sets forth the background principles for 
assigning the duties of repair and maintenance of the servient land 
                                                                                                                                        
 152. See, e.g., Kaanapali Hillside Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Doran, 162 P.3d 1277, 1290 
n.14 (Haw. 2007); In re Barker, 327 P.3d 1036, 1039-40 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); Cape May 
Harbor Vill. & Yacht Club Ass’n v. Sbraga, 22 A.3d 158, 167 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2011); Foxley & Co. v. Ellis, 201 P.3d 425, 430-31 (Wyo. 2009). 
 153. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thunderhead Invs., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1171-72 
(D. Colo. 2002); Seven Lakes Dev. Co. v. Maxson, 144 P.3d 1239, 1245-46 (Wyo. 2006); In re 
Estate of Reyes, No. 2010–SCC–0023–CIV, 2012 WL 4344166, at *8 (N. Mar. I. Sept. 21, 2012). 
 154. Restatement section 4.13 provides: “Unless the terms of a servitude determined  
under § 4.1 provide otherwise, duties to repair and maintain the servient estate and the 
improvements used in the enjoyment of a servitude are as follows: (1) The beneficiary of an 
easement or profit has a duty to the holder of the servient estate to repair and maintain 
the portions of the servient estate and the improvements used in the enjoyment of the ser-
vitude that are under the beneficiary’s control, to the extent necessary to (a) prevent un-
reasonable interference with the enjoyment of the servient estate, or (b) avoid liability of 
the servient-estate owner to third parties. (2) Except as required by § 4.9, the holder of the 
servient estate has no duty to the beneficiary of an easement or profit to repair or maintain 
the servient estate or the improvements used in the enjoyment of the easement or profit. 
(3) Joint use by the servient owner and the servitude beneficiary of improvements used in 
enjoyment of an easement or profit, or of the servient estate for the purpose authorized by 
the easement or profit, gives rise to an obligation to contribute jointly to the costs reasona-
bly incurred for repair and maintenance of the portion of the servient estate or improve-
ments used in common. (4) The holders of separate easements or profits who use the same 
improvements or portion of the servient estate in the enjoyment of their servitudes have a 
duty to each other to contribute to the reasonable costs of repair and maintenance of the 
improvements or portion of the servient estate.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
SERVITUDES § 4.13 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
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and improvements used in the enjoyment of a land-based servitude. 
This subject is of great practical necessity to assure the continuing 
usefulness of the servitude over time. The standard set by section 
4.13 is consistent with the general property law rule prevalent in 
most states.155 The responsibilities of repair and maintenance are 
presumptively allocated to the “beneficiary of an easement or profit” 
which would be the owner of the dominant parcel.156 These duties are 
established at a level needed to prevent “unreasonable interference” 
with the servient owner or to avoid creating third-party liability in 
the servient owner.157 This provision would appear to limit the servi-
ent owner’s responsibility although this matter could be adjusted in 
the design of the servitude’s original drafting. Finally, joint use of 
servitudes could give rise to a shared obligation in the co-users to re-
pair and maintain the servient estate or the improvements. In a situ-
ation where both the dominant and servient owners used the servi-
tude, both parties could be obligated to share the expense of repair 
and maintenance.158 
 Section 4.13 had a total of twenty-six mentions over the study pe-
riod making it the tenth most frequently cited provision. Of this total 
53.8% were classified as having a ‘small effect’ on the decision159 with 
another 30.7% having been noted as being ‘influential’ to the out-
come.160 With 11.5% having the most strongly positive ‘heavy reli-
ance’ characterization, section 4.13 had a more positive weighted 
score than the average Restatement provision mentioned in opinions. 
D.   Conclusions to Be Drawn from the Case Analysis. 
 The review of the database of cases discussing the Third Restate-
ment generates a number of conclusions about the set of reported 
court decisions. First, the absolute number of reported case decisions 
citing and discussing the Restatement was surprisingly small. It re-
                                                                                                                                        
 155. BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 118, § 8:37, at 8-107 to 8-108 n.2 (2014). Several 
states’ statutes recognize this obligation in the easement owner as well. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 845(a) (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.175 (West. 1991). 
 156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.13 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 157. Id. Many case decisions have found that there may be tort liability for personal 
injuries, should they be incurred on the land burdened by an easement. Numerous case 
decisions make the easement owner liable for such losses should negligent maintenance be 
established. See, e.g., Sutera v. Go Jokir, Inc., 86 F.3d 298, 303-07 (2d Cir. 1996); Morrow 
v. Boldt, 512 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Green v. Duke Power Co., 290 S.E.2d 
593, 598 (N.C. 1982).  
 158. BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 118, § 8:37, at 8-111 to 8-112 nn.14-15. 
 159. See, e.g., Dunellen, LLC v. Getty Props. Corp., 567 F.3d 35, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2009); 
Smith v. Muellner, 932 A.2d 382, 388 (Conn. 2007); Koenigs v. Mitchell Cty. Bd. of Super-
visors, 659 N.W.2d 589, 594 (Iowa 2003).  
 160. See, e.g., Price v. Eastham, 254 P.3d 1121 (Alaska 2011); DeHaven v. Hall, 753 
N.W.2d 429, 437-38 (S.D. 2008); Buck Mountain Owners’ Ass’n v. Prestwich, 308 P.3d 644, 
652-53 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).  
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flected an annual average of sixty-seven case references in forty re-
ported decisions per year over the fifteen-year study period. This vol-
ume of decisions is less than one reported case at any level in all 
states and in the entire federal judicial system.161 Even focusing sole-
ly on the last ten years, the average number of annual case refer-
ences rose slightly from sixty-seven to seventy-seven, and the aver-
age number of reported cases grew from forty to forty-eight. This 
growth represents an extremely modest, and relatively stable, series 
of annual totals reflecting no rapid acceleration in the numbers of 
either references or case decisions. These annual numbers undenia-
bly constitute a very small number of cases when they are under-
stood in the context of all reported decisions of the state and federal 
courts.162 They are especially small when compared to the judicial 
receptiveness of other Restatements in common law areas.163 Second, 
the cases containing mentions of the Restatement were overwhelm-
ingly decided by state courts on a nearly 90% basis. Within the state 
courts, the courts of appeal rather than state supreme courts were 
represented on an approximate 70% to 30% basis.164 Trial court deci-
sions barely factored into the state court pattern. However, a com-
pletely different picture was evident in the federal decisions where 
trial court decisions were the most common on a 66% to 34% basis.165 
                                                                                                                                        
 161. Separating and analyzing the entire fifteen-year study period as three five-year 
sections, the annual average number of reported cases did increase from 25.4 to 44.8 and 
then to 51.4 representing a doubling of the number of cases mentioning the Restatement 
from the first segment to the last one. Curiously, the number of references to the Restate-
ment in each case has trended downward from 1.87 references per case in the first segment 
to 1.54 references per segment in the last one. These patterns suggest that more courts are 
using the Restatement in their decisions but that they now make a more limited use of it.  
 162. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 163. One appraisal of the general impact of Restatements on the common law sets forth 
an impressive, although dated, assessment. “[T]he success of the Institute has been im-
mense. In some states, where there is no conflicting statute or earlier case law precedent, 
the Restatements are the law. As Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson 
pointed out in her Fairchild Lecture, as of March 1994 there had been 125,000 published 
court citations to Restatements, and the U.S. Supreme Court had cited the Restatements 
in no fewer than nine cases during the 1993-1994 term. Judges in every one of the fifty 
states have utilized the Restatements; while some of these are simply string citations, as 
Justice Abrahamson has observed, Restatement work has had ‘a substantial impact in the 
“real world.” ’ This impact has, if anything, intensified since; total published citations to 
Restatements by 1998 were up to 141,087.” John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 
1923-1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615, 638-39 (1998); see also David A. Thomas, Restate-
ments Relating to Property: Why Lawyers Don’t Really Care, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
655, 656 n.1 (2004) (claiming that the First and Second Restatement of Property had only 
been mentioned in 1500 cases since 1936 while the Restatements of Torts and Contracts 
had 16,500 case references). 
 164. In 2011, the balance between state appeals and state supreme court decisions 
mentioning the Restatement shifted to a 50 / 50 ratio with the supreme courts becoming 
relatively more active. 
 165. At the federal level, 65% of all cases mentioning the Restatement were from the trial 
level U.S. District Courts, Court of Claims, and Bankruptcy Courts. See supra note 77. 
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Third, regardless of the number of judicial references to the Restate-
ment, certain state decisions were much more positive than the na-
tional average with Nevada leading followed closely by Mississippi 
and Oregon.166 On the other hand, other states were much more neg-
ative in their references to the Restatement than the national aver-
age with West Virginia leading followed by the District of Columbia, 
New York, and Washington. Fourth, there was very little intensity of 
acceptance or rejection of the Restatement in most of the opinions 
mentioning it. There were, surprisingly, few state or federal decisions 
either strongly adopting or strongly rejecting a Restatement sec-
tion.167 Generally, the judicial reactions were mildly positive in de-
gree and did not gravitate towards the extremes. Fifth, the distribu-
tion of state and federal courts referring to the Restatement in their 
reported opinions varied widely throughout the nation. Over the 
study period, Arizona168 had the largest number of case decisions 
with forty-one, while Connecticut had the greatest number of specific 
references to the Restatement with eighty-eight.169 Colorado and 
Massachusetts were not far behind these states with their totals.170 
Putting this performance into a clearer national perspective, nearly 
half of the states had ten or fewer references to the Restatement over 
the fifteen-year study period.171 Some states had largely ignored the 
                                                                                                                                        
 166. The average scaled score of judicial treatment of the Restatement was 4.18 on the 
6-point scale. The scaled score average for Nevada was 5.25 followed by Mississippi and 
Oregon tied at 4.67. On the other end of the spectrum, West Virginia had a scaled score of 
2.40 while the District of Columbia was at 3.44 and New York scored 3.50.  
 167. The following state supreme courts issued decisions giving ‘heavy reliance’ to the 
Restatement: Massachusetts (5), New Jersey (5), New Mexico (5), Texas (5), Colorado (4), 
and Connecticut (4). On the negative side, the following states decisions ‘declined to adopt’ 
the Restatement: Washington (6), Wisconsin (5), and Vermont (2). In the federal courts, 
there were 5 ‘heavy reliance’ decisions but only 3 ‘decline to adopt’ rulings. 
 168. Over the study period, with 41 case decisions referring to the Restatement, Arizo-
na led the nation, followed by Connecticut (34), Colorado (31), Massachusetts (30), and 
New Jersey (18). This statistic reveals that even in the most active jurisdictions, very few 
case decisions cited to the Restatement. 
 169. Connecticut had eighty-eight mentions of the Restatement. Connecticut courts 
have recognized the Restatement since 1998 when a superior court cited it in Abington 
Limited Partnership v. Heublein, No. X01CV920151749S, 1999 WL 370534, at *28-29 
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 18, 1999) (citing the work in its Tentative Draft 4). By 2001, its 
courts had issued five more decisions, mostly at the state supreme court level. See Leydon 
v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 577 n.45 (Conn. 2001); Abington Ltd. P’ship v. Heu-
blein, 778 A.2d 885 (Conn. 2001); Giardino, LLC v. Belle Haven Land Co., 757 A.2d 1103, 
1111-12 (Conn. 2000); Bolan v. Avalon Farms Prop. Owners Ass’n, 735 A.2d 798, 804, 805 
nn.9-13 (Conn. 1999). In Connecticut, there has been strong support for the Restatement 
since the beginning from the practicing bar. See Gurdon H. Buck, Book Review, 75 CONN. 
B.J. 160, 161-64 (2001). 
 170. Connecticut (88), Colorado (84), Arizona (64), Massachusetts (61), and New Jersey 
(54) were the top 5 states in terms of the number of case references to the Restatement. 
 171. The following state courts produced <10 references to the Restatement from 2000-
2014: Arkansas (3), Delaware (6), Florida (7), Hawaii (6), Idaho (7), Indiana (1), Iowa (9),  
Minnesota (1), Mississippi (3), Missouri (7), Nebraska (7), Nevada (4), New York (2), North 
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Restatement altogether in their case decisions.172 During the same 
time period, the number of state and federal case decisions mention-
ing the term “easement,” “real covenant,” and “servitude” yielded ap-
proximately 28,000 results.173 Considered in this light, Arizona’s 
eighty-eight Restatement mentions represented a very small number 
of references. Sixth, although the entire Restatement contains nine-
ty-seven separately-numbered sections, only a few received the regu-
lar attention of the courts, and a majority of the remaining ones were 
largely ignored.174 Ten of the ninety-seven sections received nearly 
50% of all the case references during the study period.175 The top five 
most frequently referred to sections were 4.1, 1.2, 4.10, 2.17, and 4.8. 
The most commonly mentioned Restatement chapters were chapters 
1, 2, and 4 with the least frequently referred to chapters being 3, 5, 6, 
7, and 8.176 This pattern indicates that the Restatement topic areas of 
definitions, servitude creation theory, and the interpretation of servi-
tudes garnered the greatest judicial attention while the rest of the 
document largely escaped frequent and thorough discussion.  
                                                                                                                                        
Carolina (3), North Dakota (6), Oklahoma (8), Oregon (6), Rhode Island (5), South Dakota 
(10), Tennessee (10), Virginia (2), and West Virginia (5). 
 172. Several states had virtually no cases referring to the Restatement. For example, 
Indiana (1), Minnesota (1), New York (2), Virginia (2), and Arkansas (3) had the fewest 
number of case mentions. 
 173. A search in all of LexisNexis’s state court decision databases limited to [easement 
OR “real covenant” OR “equitable servitude” OR servitude]) for 2000-2014 returned 20,560 
results. Along with the 50 states, the Lexis search included D.C., Northern Mariana Is-
lands, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands courts. A search in all of Lexis’s federal court deci-
sion databases with a search limited to [easement OR “real covenant” OR “equitable servi-
tude” OR servitude] for 2000-2014 returned 7,965 results. In addition to District Courts, 
Circuit Courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court, the Lexis search included the Court of Feder-
al Claims, Military Courts, and Tax Courts. Combining the state with the federal court 
decisions, there was a total of 28,525 case references to these search terms over the fifteen-
year study period. 
 174. Examining all 1013 case references over the study period, eleven sections were 
never mentioned in any state or federal case decision while 64 of 97 (or 65%) Restatement 
sections received 10 or fewer case mentions. Of these low citation frequency sections, 55 of 
the 64 received 5 or fewer case mentions. All in all, 77% of the Restatement ’ s sections re-
ceived scant judicial treatment over the fifteen-year study period. Chapters 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 
were the principal components in these low frequency categories, and they largely had very 
limited discussion in state or federal court opinions. 
 175. This lists the most frequently mentioned Restatement sections along with the per-
centages of the total number of references: 1) section 4.1 (89 mentions / 8.8 %), section 1.2 (71 
mentions / 7%), section 4.10 (59 mentions / 5.8%), section 2.17 (57 mentions / 5.6%), section 
4.8 (49 mentions / 4.8%), section 2.16 (38 mentions / 3.8%), section 2.15 (34 mentions / 3.4%), 
section 4.9 (29 mentions / 2.9%), section 1.1 (27 mentions / 2.7%), and section 4.13 (26 men-
tions / 2.6%). The actual number of case decisions containing these references was far less 
than the number of mentions. 
 176. The most frequently mentioned Restatement sections were: chapter 1 (Defini-
tions), chapter 2 (Creation of Servitudes), and chapter 4 (Interpretation of Servitudes). The 
least frequently mentioned Restatement sections were: chapter 3 (Validity of Servitudes 
Arrangements), chapter 5 (Succession to Benefits and Burdens of Servitudes), chapter 7 
(Modification and Termination of Servitudes), and chapter 8 (Enforcement of Servitudes). 
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III.   DID THE THIRD RESTATEMENT ACHIEVE ITS PURPOSE? 
 This Article has concentrated on identifying and analyzing the 
judicial receptiveness that the Third Restatement has received dur-
ing the fifteen-year period following its final release in 2000. Pub-
lished in final form at the conclusion of a lengthy development pro-
cess and with great enthusiasm in some quarters,177 the Third Re-
statement was heralded to be within the ALI’s fundamental mandate 
to promote “the ‘clarification and simplification of the law and its bet-
ter adaptation to social needs.’ ”178 However, the Restatement went 
beyond a merely descriptive role, capturing a “snapshot” of the state 
of the law. It adopted many new principles that attempted to clarify 
the murky meaning of earlier, common law terminology and unify the 
servitude concept by making it a “modern integrated body of law.”179 
Springing from a nineteenth-century codification tradition,180 this 
recent Restatement of Property has transcended mere doctrinal sim-
plification and clarification to the “setting forth [of] fundamental 
principles of the common law in a logically ordered form.”181 The 
drafters clearly had the intention to make the common law of servi-
tudes function more smoothly and predictably.182 Significantly, the 
new Restatement also advanced normative concepts thought neces-
sary for “mak[ing] it easier to use servitudes for the important roles 
they play in modern land development.”183 The Third Restatement 
advanced ideas that would emphasize notions of economic efficiency, 
free contractual power, and doctrinal unification. Other features of 
the Restatement would allocate one party to the servitude agreement 
a greater set of rights than currently would exist under prevailing 
common law rules in many jurisdictions. The drafters clearly  
believed these principles to be desirable modifications of existing  
legal doctrine. 
 These major suggestions also raise questions about the continuing 
utility and desirability of the common law process, where judges uti-
lize the case-by-case decisional method to implement and refine legal 
rules. This traditional Anglo-American method fits legal doctrine to-
gether with specific contextual information to reach ‘fair’ and gener-
                                                                                                                                        
 177. See Buck, supra note 169, at 160-64. 
 178. Liebman, supra note 26, Forward, at X; see also French, Highlights, supra note 36, at 226.  
 179. French, Design Proposal, supra note 5, at 1231. 
 180. See generally, CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT, A 
STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981).  
 181. Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the Anti-
classical Jurisprudence of Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 216 (2007). 
 182. Predictability had been emphasized as a desirable value since the formation of the 
ALI in the 1920s. See Am. L. Inst., Proceedings, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 104-09 (1923); see also 
White, supra note 14, at 29.  
 183. French, Highlights, supra note 36, at 226. 
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ally consistent results. How should a new Restatement be considered 
by the courts in their day-to-day decisions in the myriad of property 
law conflicts involving servitudes? Should the Restatement be for-
mally adopted and made ‘hard law’ in a jurisdiction like a statute or 
codified rule?184 Should it be considered to be persuasive authority 
and viewed as a ‘soft law’ suggestion available to the common law 
courts?185 Or, should it be merely considered a well-meaning ‘academ-
ic effort’ carefully analyzing and reordering the existing common law 
but detached from the actual realities of courts employing the com-
mon law method?186 The ultimate decision of the appropriate role or 
purpose of the Restatement rests not with its drafters, but rather, 
with courts and legislatures that will or will not adjust current law  
in response. 
 The analysis of this database of case law provides a partial answer 
to the central question—can a Restatement reform the American law 
of servitudes? Theoretically, the Restatement could serve as the mod-
el for courts and legislatures to follow. However, the cases decided 
over the last fifteen years reveal that federal and state reported case 
decisions only give modest attention to the Restatement. In no single 
jurisdiction could it be said that the law of servitudes has been signif-
icantly reformed or revolutionized by the Restatement. A few state 
courts have favorably embraced a few of its provisions, but in the 
overwhelming majority of courts, the most that can be said is that 
the impact has been mildly positive.  
 What explains this phenomenon? A host of possible explanations 
exist. There is nothing to suggest that the thoroughly prepared and 
completely vetted Restatement was poorly drafted or badly reasoned. 
There is also no reason to believe that the Restatement was drafted 
to benefit a particular commercial or other interest group and is 
working to advance some undisclosed agenda. It might be possible 
that some of the novel Restatement provisions, which vary in existing 
state common law principles, may not contain sufficient persuasive 
force to convince state courts to use the Restatement as the theoreti-
                                                                                                                                        
 184. At the creation of the ALI, the founders did not wish for the new Restatements to 
serve as codes or statute. See Am. L. Inst., supra note 182, at 23 (“[W]e do not look forward 
to the principles of law [in Restatements] . . . being adopted as a code.”). 
 185. The founders of the ALI did consider the possibility that Restatements would be 
viewed as “a guide” and aid to the courts and that they would be treated as the equal of a 
state supreme court opinion having a role “in correcting existing uncertainties and other-
wise improving the law . . . .” Id. at 24-25. 
 186. One academic considered all of the Restatements of Property and reached the 
following conclusion: “With the benefit of hindsight, the Restatements generally and the 
Restatements of Property particularly, may be best viewed as academic exercises. As such, 
they have benefitted from, and given benefit as, profoundly good thought about important 
issues of law. But in the end the Restatements have had little influence on the actual daily 
application and administration of the law.” Thomas, supra note 163, at 695 (emphasis added). 
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cal foundation for a significant change in the structure of the com-
mon law. More simply, another reason might be that practitioners 
may not be familiar with the Restatement, and, as a result, they have 
not incorporated it into their briefs or court arguments.  
 Finally, a more compelling explanation for the observed results 
may rest with the nature of the common law as it relates to real 
property. It may be that courts take a special view that there is an 
overarching need for stability in the common law of property. This 
value of doctrinal stability in property law could differentiate it from 
tort or contract law doctrine. The courts’ reluctance to fully embrace 
the Restatement may also be explicable on the desire of preserving 
court control over the development of the common law of property. 
This ‘property exceptionalism’ may make courts less willing to re-
ceive comprehensive revisions to their basic property law doctrine 
from external sources. Under this view, judicial control would need to 
be maintained in order to reinforce stable framework principles and 
traditional decisionmaking authority, even if it would result in poorly 
defined legal concepts or a less than optimal doctrine. If this final 
explanation is correct, then it is not surprising that the Third Re-
statement has had its observed impact and has not been a major 
force of law reform. If this final explanation is correct, it should also 
give pause to the drafters of the Fourth Restatement who have just 
embarked on their new undertaking to prepare a comprehensive Re-
statement of Property.  
